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Methods for learning optimal policies often assume that the way the domain is con-
ceptualised—the possible states and relevant actions that are needed to solve one’s
decision problem—is known in advance and does not change during learning. This is
an unrealistic assumption in many scenarios. Often, new evidence can reveal important
information about what is possible, not just what is likely, or unlikely. A learner may
have been completely unaware such possibilities even existed prior to learning.
This thesis presents a model of an agent which discovers and exploits unforeseen
possibilities from two sources of evidence: domain exploration and communication
with an expert. The model combines probabilistic and symbolic reasoning to estimate
all components of the decision problem, including the set of belief variables, the
possible actions, and the probabilistic dependencies between variables. Unlike prior
work on solving decision problems by discovering and learning to exploit unforeseen
possibilities (e.g., Rong (2016); McCallum and Ballard (1996)), our model supports
discovering and learning to exploit unforeseen factors, as opposed to an additional
atomic state. Becoming aware of an unforeseen factor presents computational challenges
when compared with becoming aware of an additional atomic state, because even a
boolean factor doubles the size of the decision problem’s hypothesis space as opposed
to increasing it by just one more state. We show via experiments that one can meet
those challenges by adopting (defeasible) reasoning principles that are familiar from
the literature on belief revision: roughly, default to simple models over more complex
ones and default to conserving what you’ve learned from prior evidence.
For one-step decision problems, our agent learns the components of a Decision Network;
for sequential problems, it learns a Factored Markov Decision Process. We prove
convergence theorems for our models, given the learner’s and expert’s strategies for
gathering evidence. Furthermore, our experiments show that the agent converges on




When learning to how to identify the best plans of action in a given environment,
humans have the remarkable ability to adapt what they already know to totally new and
unforeseen information. For example, when we are taught a new skill, we can easily
imagine how we might apply that skill in scenarios we have encountered previously.
Similarly, when we ask someone a question about what will happen in a given situation,
their answer might not just merely tell us what is most likely from a list of outcomes we
had already anticipated. Instead, they might inform us of an outcome that we had never
even thought of. Despite not expecting this answer, we can integrate such information
into our previous understanding of the world without much difficulty.
Most artificial intelligence systems, on the other hand, have become very good at
analysing large amounts of data so as to find the optimal solution to a given task,
but only provided that all the actions the system is allowed to take, as well as all
the outcomes that can possibly occur are explicitly specified in advance. If, mid-way
through the task, the system is informed of some previously unforeseen action it can take,
or encounters an unforeseen concept that it so far hasn’t considered when distinguishing
one state of affairs from another, then the system will not know how to adapt what it’s
already learned to incorporate these unforeseen possibilities and then learn to exploit
them.
This thesis takes a different approach and presents an artificial intelligence system that
learns not just from raw data, but also from advice from an informed expert. In this way,
our system mirrors the teacher-apprentice model of learning, which is common between
humans. Our informed expert can interject during the task with advice and corrections,
which may include concepts our system was previously completely unaware of. We
provide a method by which our system can integrate this new unforeseen concept into
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This thesis explores the problem of an agent learning optimal policies when it starts
unaware of factors that are critical to solving its task. In typical machine learning tasks,
a learner starts with some fixed set of hypotheses, but is uncertain about which of them
is the most likely (and is perhaps also uncertain about the rewards they will obtain
from the possible outcomes of their actions). In this thesis, “unawareness” has a much
stronger meaning, concerning the ignorance of something’s existence as opposed to its
relative likelihood—what if the learner was initially unaware of the set of hypotheses
itself?
Consider the following medical example: Suppose a decision making agent prescribes
a drug which it has learned from past experience is effective at treating a certain illness.
However, a senior pharmacologist later objects to the prescription based on a reason
totally unforeseen by the agent—the patient carries a newly discovered genetic trait,
and the drug produces harmful side effects in its carriers. Instead, the pharmacologist
suggests prescribing to the patient a new topical cream (which the agent had not
previously heard of), which is slightly less effective at treating the illness, but does not
produce harmful side effects. These unforeseen discoveries (becoming aware of the
existence of the new genetic trait and new topical cream) may occur after the agent
has already learned quite a lot about how other (foreseen) factors impact the drug’s
effectiveness.
This example illustrates at least three challenges, the combination of which typically is
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not handled by current methods for learning optimal behaviour (Chapter 2 contains a
detailed discussion of related work):
1. In addition to starting ignorant of the probabilistic structure of the decision
problem, the relative likelihood among possible states and the range of rewards
they engender, the agent starts unaware of even the true set of possible actions
and states themselves.
2. Domain exploration alone might not be enough to discover these unknown factors.
For instance, it is unlikely the agent would discover the concept of a new genetic
trait by just continuing to prescribe drugs and observing their effect. Expert
instruction may be necessary to overcome unawareness.
3. An expert might interject with relevant advice during learning, not just at the
beginning when the initial model of the problem is designed.
As Coenen et al. (2017) point out, such scenarios are common in human discussion—the
answer to a question may not only provide information about which of the questioner’s
existing hypotheses are likely, but also reveal unforeseen consequences not yet con-
sidered. This example also shows that it is often infeasible for an agent to gather an
exhaustive explanation of all relevant factors prior to learning. A domain expert may
find it difficult or impossible to express all details of a decision problem in advance due
to lack of knowledge, cognitive constraints on either the expert or learner, or limitations
on communication. However, it may be easy for an expert to offer contextually relevant
advice during learning.
There are many other examples of such scenarios are in the real world. The invention of
vaccinations or the creation of new financial instruments are examples of discovering
new actions in medicine and finance. The discovery of syphilis added a previously
unknown consequence to the act of sex.1 Another example is in robotic skill learning.
Methods like Cakmak and Thomaz (2012) enable an expert to teach a robot how to
perform a new action, but not necessarily when it is optimal to use it (the latter task
being the focus of this thesis). In lifelong learning scenarios, there is a need for flexible
and robust responses to a vast array of contingencies (Silver, 2011; Thrun and Pratt,
2012). We would like such a robot to continually add to its knowledge, and revise
the hypothesis space of possible states and actions within which decisions are made.
In this context, there is a need for autonomous model management (Liebman et al.,
1These examples are from Karni and Viero (2013)
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2017), which calls for reasoning about what the hypothesis space is, in addition to
policy learning within those hypothesis spaces.
Current learning and decision making models do not address such issues; they assume
the task is to use data to refine a distribution over a fixed hypothesis space. In these
frameworks, any change to the set of possible hypotheses constitutes a unrelated
problem. The above examples, however, illustrate a sort of reverse bayesianism (Karni
and Viero, 2013), where the hypothesis space itself expands over time.
An inevitable consequence of a learner starting out unaware of critical factors is that
its conceptualisation of the domain might be deficient: it fails to discriminate among
states where a crucial factor (which the agent is unaware of) takes different values. In
light of this, one might be tempted to side-step the difficult problem of overcoming
unawareness of states and actions, and instead represent unawareness implicitly via
an infinite number of hidden variables (Doshi-Velez, 2009; Wood et al., 2006), or
abandon learning a structured model and use densely connected layers of hidden nodes
to learn optimal behaviour directly from raw sensory input (Mnih et al., 2015). Deep
reinforcement learning in particular (e.g. Mnih et al. (2015)) has proved useful for
learning implicit representations of large problems, particularly in domains where
sensory input is complex and high-dimensional (e.g. computer vision). However, in
many such models, the focus of attention for abstraction and representation learning
is on perceptual features rather than probabilistic relations (see e.g. (Pearl, 2018))
and other decision-centric attributes. For instance, in work by Chen et al. (2015),
who demonstrate an end-to-end solution to the problem of autonomous driving, the
decisions are not elaborated beyond “follow the lane” or “change lanes” although
significant perceptual representation learning may need to happen in order to work with
the predicate “lane” within the raw sensory streams (often relying on millions or billions
of data trials). For safety critical reasons, or ones involving significant investment (e.g.
driving a car, advising on a medical procedure, deciding on crops to grow for the year) it
is important that a system can explain the reasoning behind its decisions so the user can
trust its judgement. This issue lies behind recent major funding initiatives in explainable
AI (e.g., DARPA-BAA-16-53 (2016)).
We instead propose a system which explicitly overcomes its unawareness, and constructs
an interpretable structured model of the problem.
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1.2 Contributions
This thesis presents an agent that, in a complementary approach to representation
learning in batch mode from large data sets, uses evidence and a reasoning mechanism
to incrementally construct an interpretable model of a decision problem from which
optimal policies can be computed. The main contributions of this thesis are:
1. We provide a model for learning in which an agent starts unaware of the existence
of factors on which an optimal policy depends, then learns optimal behaviour
via direct experience and expert advice. The learning proceeds incrementally
such that, at every step of the task, the agent is able to produce a compact and
interpretable model representing its beliefs about the variables and probabilistic
structure of the task. Crucially, the agent can revise all components of its model.
This means not just the probabilistic dependencies between variables (Chapter
3), but also the domain of the reward function, and the set of state variables and
actions itself (Chapters 4 and 5).
2. We specify a communication framework via which an expert offers advice to
the agent during learning: that is, advice is offered in reaction to the agent’s
latest attempts to solve the task, rather than all expert input being provided prior
to learning. By offering contextual advice in a piecemeal manner, we have
worked towards ensuring the interaction between the agent and expert builds
upon dialogue moves that would be quite natural between a human expert and
learner (for example, correcting the agent when they make a sub-optimal move, or
helping the agent resolve a conflict between its current model and the latest piece
of evidence). This contrasts with fully exhaustive explanations of a task, which
may be impossible for a human expert to articulate due to lack of knowledge,
cognitive constraints, or limitations on the method of communication.
Under our model, the expert advice can include mentions of factors which the
agent didn’t know existed, thereby exposing the agent to unforeseen possibili-
ties. This advice provides important qualitative information to complement the
quantitative information conveyed by statistical correlations in the domain trials.
What is not covered in this thesis is the pervasive ambiguity that is inherent in
natural language, which is beyond the scope of our work. Rather, the signals
that the agent and expert exchange are more like formal semantic representations
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of natural language utterances, once parsed and disambiguated as the speaker
intended (see Sections 4.2.1 and 5.3.1 for details).
3. We state theorems and proofs which show that our agent-expert dialogue strategy
is one where the learner is guaranteed to eventually become aware of all the
actions and variables necessary to express the true optimal policy (see Theorems
1 and 4 on pages 59 and 93 ).
Our model also guarantees that the learner, at all times, assumes a (graphical)
model of its decision problem which is well-formed and consistent with all
evidence it has observed so far (see Theorem 2, page 60). We can therefore
guarantee that the learner’s model can be used to compute what the learner
currently believes to be an optimal policy. This is typically not an issue for
standard learning tasks where the hypothesis space is completely known in
advance of learning, but is one which must be carefully considered when evidence
can expand a learner’s conceptualisation of the decision problem.
4. We conduct experiments across a suite of both hand-crafted problems from
existing literature (which have been chosen on the grounds that they represent
practical real-world problems) and randomly generated decision problems (which
demonstrate our method’s robustness to problems of varying complexity). These
experiments demonstrate that, in practice as well as in theory, the agent can learn
the optimal policy from evidence, even when initially unaware of variables that
are critical to its success (Sections 4.4, 5.4)
1.3 Task Overview and Scope
For a given decision problem, our agent’s overarching goal is to learn a model which
guides it towards an optimal decision policy. As is traditional in AI, we adopt a
Savagean model of rational action (Savage, 1972): the agent’s action is an optimal
trade-off between what it prefers and what it believes it can achieve. More formally, for
a one-step decision problem, this means the agent will take the action a∗ which, given
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Here, R (s) is the reward function, which gives the real-valued reward received for
entering state s. The distribution P(s|a,e) gives the probability of entering state s given
observed evidence e and that the agent took action a.
As is standard in learning tasks, the agent may not initially know R or P(s|a,e), and
so must estimate them via trial-and-error in the task, or by receiving advice from an
informed expert. However, the core issue in this thesis is that the agent faces the extra
difficulty of starting unaware of certain possible actions a ∈ A, or is unaware of certain
states s ∈ S on which the optimal policy depends. To put this another way, the agent
starts out not knowing the set A nor the state space S . The task then, is to use evidence
from both domain exploration and expert advice to learn the optimal policy, despite
beginning with an initial model defined over an incomplete set of possible states and
actions, with incorrect dependencies among them, and a possibly incorrect reward
function. Each chapter addresses increasingly complex versions of this core scenario.
Chapter 3 sets up some preliminaries for the rest of the thesis by describing a method for
learning the probabilistic structure of a problem from data. Our key contribution here is
to show that existing methods for learning Bayesian Networks (BNs) can be extended
to the case where not all belief variables are known prior to learning, but are added
incrementally during learning. Chapter 4 then builds on this initial framework to show
how an agent can learn not just the probabilistic structure of a problem, but also learn
an optimal policy for taking actions within single-stage environments. This chapter also
shows the mechanism by which the agent actually overcomes its initial unawareness.
Chapter 5 then extends the agent’s capabilities further to deal with sequential tasks,
where the agent’s current actions may affect not just its current immediate reward, but
also have long-term effects on future states and rewards.
To restrict the scope of our task, this thesis deals exclusively with decision problems
where all variables have finite and discrete values. The tasks considered are also all
stationary. This means that the true properties of the underlying decision problem do
not change over time. Further we assume that all variables are fully observable once
an agent becomes aware of them. This means that, for example, if an agent becomes
aware of a variable Xi at time step t, then the agent can observe the value of this variable
at all subsequent time steps t ′ > t.2
2We do not, however, make the much stronger assumption that the agent can re-perceive past domain
trials upon discovering an unforeseen factor. In our example, this means that the agent cannot go back
and observe the value of Xi at time steps t ′ < t.
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The primary goal of the work in this thesis is to show that, under our model, it is
possible for an agent to overcome its initial unawareness and learn all relevant factors
necessary to learn the true optimal policy for a given task. Additionally however, we
also investigate whether the intuitive principles used to guide the design of our learner
actually result in better performance.
One of these principles is that of Minimality. Minimality is essentially a form of
Occam’s razor, which means that we prefer simple models over complex ones. This
preference already underpins most existing model-based learning techniques (Koller,
2009), as simpler models not only make inference and learning more computationally
tractable, but also tend to generalize better to unseen data.
We also investigate the value of Conservativity in incremental learning. Conservativity
is the compelling intuition that when the learner discovers a new unforeseen possibility,
they should preserve as much as possible about what they inferred from past evidence,
even when this new discovery forces them to revise their current model to remain
consistent with new evidence. Conservativity underlies existing symbolic models of
common-sense reasoning (Poole, 1993; Hobbs et al., 1993; Alchourrn et al., 1985),
the acquisition of probabilistic dependencies (Bramley et al., 2016; Buntine, 1991)
and preference change (Hansson, 1995; Cadilhac et al., 2015). These principles are
deliberately stated in broad terms here in the introduction, as they influence design
decisions across many parts of the learning model. We will highlight throughout
the thesis the explicit algorithms, formulas and properties of the model where these
principles manifest.
In general, the results of this thesis offer several key insights:
• It is feasible to build agents that learn optimal policies even when they start out
unaware of the existence of almost all critical factors, and even on relatively large
decision problems (e.g., those featuring upwards of a million atomic states).
• Using algorithms which favour minimal complexity allows one to keep the
learning of complex decision problems tractable without harming the learner’s
ability to eventually converge upon the optimal policy (Section 4.4).
• Having an agent conserve its previous beliefs upon discovering previously un-
foreseen factors has a number of advantages. Not only does it prevent the quality
of the agent’s learned model from degrading throughout learning (Section 3.3),
but also results in faster convergence to the optimal policy in terms of both
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computational time and number of trials (Sections 4.4 and 5.4).
• Depending on the application domain, one can choose to trade-off the quality of
the agent’s learned policy against the amount of time the expert spends giving
advice to the agent. This can be done by altering the expert’s tolerance towards
the agents mistakes (Sections 4.4 and 5.4).
Chapter 2
Related Work
This chapter provides an overview of related literature dealing with both symbolic and
statistical approaches to decision-making and learning. In particular, it highlights how
such works deal with unawareness, and the gap our work fills in this area.
2.1 Decision Theory and Preference
The traditional analysis of rational action optimises the trade-off between what you
prefer and what you believe can achieve (Savage, 1972). This notion is typically
formalized as maximizing expected utility (See equation (1.1) in the introduction).
However, such formalisms assume the hypothesis space — the set of possible states S
and actions A—is fixed and known in advance. Changing the hypothesis space under
this framework essentially amounts to considering an unrelated decision problem. In
this thesis, our agent discovers new states and actions through growing awareness,
but instead of treating the expanded hypothesis space as an unrelated problem, it uses
its experience before the discovery to inform its behaviour and inferences after the
discovery.
Some recent works do integrate unawareness into a theory of decision making. Karni
and Viero (2013) present a set of representation theorems and update principles which
formalize an agent’s growing awareness about a hypothesis space. Such representations
are framed as Reverse Bayesianism: Bayesian methods consider the complete hypothesis
space, then shrink the space of plausible states as evidence reveals which states are
unlikely. Reverse Bayesian methods start with an incomplete view of the hypothesis
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space and expand the set of plausible states as evidence reveals new possibilities. Such
work is valuable in that it shows that a principled theory of rational action exists even in
the face of expanding awareness, and many of the theorems for updating beliefs which
result as a consequence of the axioms of their representation (e.g. that the likelihood
ratios over existing beliefs should be preserved when new possibilities are introduced)
align with the intuitive principle of Conservativity (Section 1.3) that the model in this
thesis is based upon.
This thesis builds on such theorems to explore how an agent could discover these gaps
in awareness in the first place via trial and error and dialogue (4.2.1). Additionally,
Karni and Viero (2013) remain neutral on the specific structure the agent’s probabilistic
beliefs should take, and consequently provide no algorithms which support modelling
dependencies among probabilistic factors within a given domain. Such probabilistic
structure allows one to exploit probabilistic independencies during learning and infer-
ence, and are therefore necessary to scale these tasks to cope with the complexity of
practical and realistic decision problems (e.g., it is not unusual for the domain to admit
millions of atomic states). This thesis explores how such updates on growing awareness
might be applied to explicit structured representations, such as decision networks and
factored markov decision processes. These allow us to analyse larger problems by
providing a compact representation of the joint probability distribution of the problem.
One further difference is that, while Karni and Viero (2013) provide a set of important
foundational theorems, they do not test the performance of their models empirically.
This thesis focuses on evaluating the empirical performance of such approaches to
unawareness in a concrete implementation of a learning agent.
Karni and Viero (2017) go further, allowing the agent to imagine that their current
conception of the hypothesis space is incomplete as part of its decision policy, even if
the agent is unsure what they might be unaware of. Agents who do not consider this
possibility are “Myopic”, since they always evaluate actions as if their current view of
the hypothesis space is complete, even if they have expanded their awareness in the
past. These considerations present an interesting problem, but are outside the scope of
this thesis. The agent presented in subsequent sections considers the utility of actions in
the “Myopic” sense described above.
Discovering a new state or action may prompt revisions of the reward function itself
rather than just the probability distribution over belief states. However, current models
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of preference which support revision on discovering an unforeseen possibility assume
a qualitative preference model (Hansson, 1995; Cadilhac et al., 2015). Following
Cadilhac et al. (2015), we use evidence to dynamically construct an ever more specific
partial description of preferences (with the agent defaulting to indifference to produce a
complete preference function from the partial description). Unlike Cadilhac et al. (2015),
the learning agent uses evidence to estimate numeric payoffs rather than qualitative
preference relations.
2.2 Unawareness Logics and Game Theory
There is a growing body of work on how to model unawareness as an epistemic concept
within agents (Fagin and Halpern, 1987; Board et al., 2011). These theories deal with
the problem of developing a logically precise model of the agent’s unawareness of
particular facts.
Other work approaches these issues from a game-theoretic perspective (Feinberg, 2004;
Halpern and Rego, 2013; Heifetz et al., 2013) and focus on when the agent’s unaware-
ness causes it to deviate from truly optimal behaviour (and how an adversary might
exploit such gaps in awareness).
However, all such work interprets awareness from an omniscient perspective which is
capable of modelling all possible options. A fully aware agent (e.g. the domain expert
in this thesis) or an analyst can model an unaware agent in this way, but it does not
characterise the unaware agent’s own subjective perspective (Li, 2008). In contrast, our
learning task requires the unaware agent to use evidence to expand and change its set of
possible options.
2.3 Structure Learning for Decision Problems
As part of its task, the agent must learn and revise an interpretable model of the decision
problem to incorporate newly discovered actions and concepts. Hence, part of the task
is to incrementally learn the domain’s probabilistic structure. Several approaches exist
for jointly learning probabilistic dependencies in an online setting (Bramley et al., 2016;
Buntine, 1991; Friedman, 1998; Alcobe, 2005) and also for exploiting causal structure
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to speed-up inference (Albrecht and Ramamoorthy, 2016).
This thesis extends this work in three main ways to meet the objectives described in
Chapter 1. First, current models for learning dependencies all assume that the vocabulary
of belief variables does not change during learning, but in our task it changes when the
agent becomes aware of an unforeseen action or concept. Second, since optimal actions
depend on payoffs as well as beliefs, this thesis integrates learning dependencies with
learning potential pay-offs. Third, our model uses both domain trails and expert advice
as evidence. Methods such as Buntine (1991) can technically support the incorporation
of expert evidence too, but only if the messages are about probabilistic relations and are
all declared before learning. In contrast, our model interleaves dialogue and learning.
This enables the expert to offer advice in a timely and contextually relevant manner,
which means they can explain particular outcomes and correct mistakes. There are many
scenarios where a human expert cannot articulate to full extent their skill and expertise
in a lengthy monologue prior to learning; they can, however, react in a competent way
to specific scenarios that the learner and expert encounter as the learner attempts to
learn the task.
There has been some work on inferring the probabilistic structure and utilities of other
agents using influence diagrams (Bielza et al., 2010; Nielsen and Jensen, 2004; Suryadi
and Gmytrasiewicz, 1999). More broadly, work on inverse reinforcement learning
(Rafferty et al., 2015; Herman et al., 2016; Wu et al., 2018) attempts to estimate
an agent’s beliefs and preferences based on observing their actions. However, the
majority of such work assumes the task is simply to learn a reward function for the
agent given full knowledge of its probabilistic beliefs about the world, or attempts to
estimate probabilistic parameters given a fixed, known structure. Our work considers
the scenario in which the agent may start unaware of the probabilistic structure, or even
the set of variables which are relevant to optimal behaviour.
One alternative way to think about modelling probabilistic dependencies in an incom-
plete hypothesis space is to represent factors the agent may be unaware of as a potentially
infinite number of latent (hidden) variables. Such non-parametric approaches to struc-
ture learning (e.g. Wood et al. (2006)) leverage Monte-Carlo sampling techniques to
form a distribution over a number of potential structures with an unbounded number of
latent variables. This technique is valuable for discovering latent structure within an
existing data set. However, such methods stop short of seeking out explanations for what
these latent structures actually represent in terms of the underlying decision problem.
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Our model instead takes the approach of attempting expand and repair the model when
such deficiencies are discovered, linking unforeseen possibilities to explicitly named
state and action variables via contextual expert advice.
2.4 Reinforcement Learning and Sequential Decisions
The literature on learning optimal policies for sequential decision problems includes
methods for dealing with numerous types of change, such as noise in sensing and
actuation (Da Silva et al., 2006), and non-stationary rewards (Besbes et al., 2014).
Such methods have also been applied in situations involving hidden variables (e.g. with
Partially Observed Markov Decision Processes (Leonetti et al., 2011)) or in cases where
the learner must reason about the underlying probabilistic structure of the problem
(e.g. with Factored Markov Decision Processes (Degris et al., 2006)). However, these
methods require all possible states and actions to be known in advance of learning. In
contrast, our agent learns these components from evidence.
There are a few notable exceptions in the reinforcement learning (RL) literature, which
attempt to relax the standard assumption that all possible states and actions are known in
advance of learning. Rong (2016) define Markov Decision Processes with Unawareness
(MDPUs), which can learn optimal behaviour when an agent starts unaware of some
actions. They apply MDPUs to a robotic-motion task with around 1000 discretised
atomic states. The agent uses an explore move, which randomly reveals useful motions
they were previously unaware of.
Our work differs from theirs in several ways. First, we provide a concrete mechanism
for discovering unforeseen factors via expert advice, rather than random discovery from
the agent’s own exploration. This gets us closer to supporting interactive task learning
(Laird et al., 2017) of the kind which happens between a human apprentice and expert.
Second, we allow the agent to discover explicit belief variables rather than atomic
states, and focus more on exploiting the inherent structure present in problems with
large numbers of features. This enables us to conduct experiments in Section 4.4 with
upwards of a million distinct atomic states (as compared to the roughly 1000 atomic
states in the experiments of Rong (2016)).
Another exception is the family of selective perception methods, such as the U-tree
algorithm of McCallum and Ballard (1996). These methods were designed for problems
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where the true state space may technically be available, but is infeasibly large to reason
with. The U-tree method initially treats all states as indistinguishable, then recursively
splits states in two as the agent discovers significant differences in their expected reward.
The agent thus learns an increasingly complex representation of the state space as and
when observable evidence justifies the increase in complexity. The U-Tree algorithm is
a powerful approach to handling large sequential decision problems. However, there
are three main learning tasks that our model supports that the U-tree algorithm does
not. First, our model accommodates situations where the agent is made aware of an
entirely new possible action, while the U-Tree algorithm assumes that the set of actions
remains fixed. Secondly, our model learns from (qualitative) evidence provided by
a domain expert, as well as evidence from trial and error. Thirdly, our model learns
unforeseen concepts and probabilistic relations among them, while the U-tree algorithm
does not reason about which dimensions define the state space, nor their probabilistic
dependencies. This third difference is related to the second: we ultimately want our
model to enable an agent to learn about the domain and how to behave in it from a
human expert, and it is quite natural for a human to justify why one state is difference
from another on the basis of concepts on which optimal behaviour depends by saying,
for instance “wrapping an item in bubble-wrap makes it less likely to break”. Our model
supports learning from this type of evidence.
As explained in Chapter 5, model-based sequential problems require us to provide
not just a graphical structure that captures the probabilistic dependencies among the
variables defining the hypothesis space, but also to one to exploit the structure present
in the reward and policy functions. To maintain tractability throughout the problem,
our method uses decision trees (Boutilier et al., 2000), but there is a wide literature
on alternative structured representations of rewards and policies (Hoey et al., 1999;
Guestrin et al., 2003; Boutilier et al., 2001; van Otterlo, 2009). The focus of this thesis
however is not on exploring the most efficient structured representations (something
which is often domain-specific) but rather on showing generally how such structured
representations can be built upon to accommodate a hypothesis space which grows with
the agent’s own awareness.
Deep reinforcement learning (Mnih et al., 2015) also aims to learn a suitable abstraction
of the data to enhance convergence toward optimal policies. Deep reinforcement
learning combines deep learning (i.e. a convolutional network or CNN (Bengio, 2013;
Hinton et al., 2006)) with reinforcement learning, and has proven extremely useful (e.g.
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see Chouard (2016)). However, the major successes in deep reinforcement learning
have not so far considered changing state-action spaces in the sense of the examples
discussed in Chapter 1 (e.g., discovering a new genetic trait or possible treatment in
the case of the medical example). Instead, the focus has been on using a large number
(typically, in the millions or tens of millions) of domain trials to re-describe a large
state-action space in terms of abstracted versions that render policy learning more
tractable.
As argued previously however, we believe that without evidence conveyed by an outside
expert, an agent may never find out the parts that are missing from their initial model.
If we wish to accommodate a learning process which allows the integration of expert
advice during learning, then our model for learning must be incremental and be able
to handle updates from qualitative information as well as quantitative information.
Unfortunately, expert evidence about causal relations (“X causes Y”) or preference (“If
C is true, then doing X is better than doing Y”) are inherently symbolic. Adjusting
weights in a sub-symbolic representation like a CNN so that it satisfies certain qualitative
properties is currently an open problem. Another limitation is that implicit models
generated by DRL lack explainability–they are unable to elaborate on why a given
action was recommended over another. Our approach complements methods like
DRL by dynamically building an interpretable model of the decision problem. Such
interpretable models make it easier for the agent to explain the reasons behind a given
decision, and also allow the agent to evaluate its interpretation of expert messages
against its current conceptualisation of the decision problem via the standard logical
technique of model checking.
2.5 Dialogue and Active Learning
There are several areas of research in which expert evidence is used to improve the
performance of a learning agent. In Transfer Learning—where knowledge of the
optimal policy for a source task is used to improve performance on a related target
task (Taylor and Stone, 2009)—the transfer of knowledge is sometimes captured via
an expert “giving advice” to a learner (Torrey et al., 2006). Typically, both the source
and target task must belong to the same domain. If they do not, an explicit mapping
is usually provided from the states and actions in the source task to the states and
actions in the target task. In contrast, our agent incrementally learns a single task, but is
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occasionally made aware of new concepts, which it must learn to accommodate into
its current knowledge, which in turn has been learned from prior evidence. Another
difference is that in transfer learning, the expert advice is all declared before the agent
begins learning. In our model, the agent and expert engage in a dialogue throughout
learning.
Knox and Stone (2009, 2010) use human expert evidence to inform RL, but they
confine this evidence to updating the likely outcomes of actions and their rewards; they
do not support cases where expert evidence reveals information that the agent was
not aware was possible. On the other hand, researchers have developed models for
learning optimal policies via a combination of domain actions and natural language
instructions, where the instructions may include neologisms, whose semantics the agent
must learn (e.g. Liang (2005)). However, this work assumes that the neologism denotes
an already known concept within the agent’s abstract planning language. For example,
on encountering the neologism “block”, the agent’s task is to learn that it maps to the
concept block that is already an explicit part of the agent’s domain model. In contrast,
we support learning optimal policies when the neologism denotes a concept that the
agent is currently unaware of; e.g. to support learning when block is not part of the
agent’s conceptualisation of the domain.
Forbes et al. (2015) use embodied natural language instructions to support teaching a
robot a new skill (a task known as learning by demonstration). Their model learns how
to map a natural language neologism to what might be a novel combination of sensory
values—in this sense, the meaning of the neologism may be an unforeseen concept—
and this novel concept then informs the task of learning new motor controls. In effect,
this work links a rapidly growing body of research on learning how to ground natural
language neologisms in embodied environments (known as the symbol grounding
problem (Siskind, 1996; Hristov et al., 2017) with learning a new skill. What it does
not support is integrating the newly acquired skill into an existing hypothesis space
consisting of other actions, consequences and rewards; so they do not support learning
optimal policies when both this new skill and other actions (and related concepts) are
needed.
Our aim in this thesis is to supply a complimentary set of learning algorithms to this
prior work. Like Forbes et al. (2015), our agent learns from both trial and error and
from instruction. Instead of focussing, as they do, on learning how to execute a new
skill however, we instead focus on learning when it is optimal to execute it. Given
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that we wish to support larger planning tasks, we also broaden the goals to discovering
and learning to exploit arbitrary unforeseen concepts, not just the learning of spatial
concepts that Forbes et al. (2015) are limited to (see also Dobnik et al. (2012)). On
the other hand, natural language ambiguity makes extracting the hidden message from
natural language utterances a highly complex process (Grice, 1975; Bos et al., 2004;
Zettlemoyer and Collins, 2007; Reddy et al., 2016). We bypass this complexity by
using a formal language as the medium of conversation. This formal language can be
broadly construed as the kind of language one uses to represent the output of natural
language semantic parsing (Artzi and Zettlemoyer, 2013). Replacing the expert that
we deploy in our experiments with an expert human would require linking the model
we present in this thesis with existing work on grounded natural language acquisition
and understanding. Additionally, we also bypass learning how to compute referents
that are denoted by the speaker’s message in the visual environment (i.e. we do not
tackle the problem of grounded language acquisition). Instead, when the speaker utters
a neologism, we simply supply the agent with the ability to sense its value in subsequent
states that the agent experiences. Ultimately, to build an agent which learns directly
from natural language input from a human teacher, one would need to combine our
current model (which models how to exploit unforeseen domain factors) with natural
language acquisition and understanding techniques. This is an ambitious task which is
beyond the scope of this thesis, but forms a major focus of our future work.
In the taxonomy of traditional machine learning tasks, interaction with an expert (or
oracle) is often categorised as an instance of active learning (Settles, 2009). In active
learning, rather than passively observing evidence from a sequence of domain trials, a
learning agent is given some control over which kinds of evidence it observes. Often
this control is exercised by requesting evidence from an expert.
Murphy (2001) describes an active learning framework in which the agent can fix the
value of certain state variables in each upcoming observation. This effectively allows
the agent to perform causal interventions, allowing them to more effectively discover the
causal dependencies between variables. Masegosa and Moral (2013) take this further
and allow the agent to ask about explicit edges in the probabilistic structure itself. In
both these papers however, they assume that the set of state variables is fixed and
known in advance. This means, for example, that the expert cannot tell the agent that a
probabilistic dependency exists between a variable that the agent asked about and some
entirely new variable which the agent is currently unaware of. As mentioned previously,
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our model allows for expert evidence which may result in an expansion of the agent’s
current vocabulary. Another minor difference is that, to evaluate which question about
probabilistic dependency will offer the largest information gain, the agent in Masegosa
and Moral (2013) must calculate a probability distribution over all possible probabilistic
structures (or approximate one using monte-carlo sampling methods) using the entire
batch of data observed so far. Such a procedure is expensive and difficult to integrate
into an on-line learning scenario. In contrast, our agent asks questions in response
to conflicts between the current piece of evidence and its current model, or when it
explicitly fails to learn a valid model.
Lakkaraju et al. (2017) tackle learning “unknown unknowns” via interaction with
an oracle. This work addresses a specific type of unawareness: an agent assigns an
incorrect label to a trial with high confidence. Crucially however, they assume that the
correct label for this trial must be a label that the agent is already currently aware of.
In other words, they exclude the option that the hypothesis space itself is incomplete,
which is the type of unawareness that we are interested in.
Chapter 3
Incremental Learning of Bayesian
Networks with Expanding Awareness
In this chapter, we introduce the concept of unawareness as it relates to probabilistic
beliefs. We start by showing how an agent incrementally learns both the probabilistic
structure and parameters of a problem by learning a Bayesian Network. We then show
how an agent can adapt what it has learned so far upon becoming aware of previously
unforeseen variables.
The contribution of this chapter is to take existing incremental methods for learning BNs
and adapt them to account for the discovery of unforeseen variables during learning.
We show through experiments on several well-known BN learning problems that our
learner converges to an accurate model of the underlying distribution (and accurate
representation of that distribution’s structure) even when initially unaware of important
belief variables. Further, by conserving information learned from past data each time
a new belief variable is discovered, our model is able to learn with more consistency
than one which abandons such information to start learning “from scratch” in the newly
expanded hypothesis space.
In later chapters, we build on these initial techniques by applying them to decision
problems where an agent must deal with unawareness of actions and rewards, as well
as just belief variables. Further, we will later build on the abstract notion of “expanding
one’s awareness” outlined in this chapter by providing a concrete mechanism by which
an agent can become aware of unforeseen factors via discussion with an informed
expert.
29








Figure 3.1: The Asia BN. Arrows between nodes indicate probabilistic dependencies
between variables
We begin by summarizing bayesian networks and techniques to learn them when the
agent is fully aware of all belief variables in the hypothesis space (but is ignorant of
the conditional independence among variables in the domain, and of the probability
distributions). In subsequent chapters, we then extend this problem to one where the
agent begins unaware of relevant variables in the hypothesis space.
3.1 Learning Bayesian Networks with Full Awareness
Bayesian networks (BNs) decompose the state space of a problem into a set of belief
variables X = {X1, . . .Xn}. Each state s is a joint assignment to all variables in X
(i.e., s ∈ v(X )). A BN is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) denoted Pa, and parameters θ
which exploit the conditional independencies between variables in X . For each X ∈ X ,
PaX ∈ Pa is the parent set of X . Given PaX , the value of X is conditionally independent
of all Y ∈ X \PaX which are non-descendants of X . The parameters θX ∈ θ then define
the conditional probability distributions θX = P(X |PaX). Figure 3.1 gives an example
of the Asia network used in some of the experiments at the end of the chapter. We
can see for example that a patient’s chances of getting tuberculosis are independent of
whether they smoke, have lung cancer, etc., if we know whether they have been to Asia
(because Patub = {asia}).
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Given X , we can learn the most likely structure Pa∗ and parameters θ∗ from observed
data D0:t = [d0, . . . ,dt ] (where di ∈ v(X )) by learning P(Pa|D0:t) and P(θ|D0:t ,Pa). A
common way to calculate P(Pa|D0:t) is to use the Bayesian Dirichlet Score (BD-Score)




BDt(X ,PaX) = P(PaX)∏
j∈v(PaX )
β(Nt0| j +α0| j, . . . ,N
t
m| j +αm| j)
β(α0| j, . . . ,αm| j)
(3.2)
Here, β(n1, . . . ,nm) is the multivariate beta function, and NtX=i|PaX= j is the number
of states in D0:t where X has assignment i and its parents have joint assignment j.1
For example, the term Ntlung=1|smoke=0 describes the number of trials in D0:t where the
patient has lung cancer, but doesn’t smoke. The αi| j parameters come from the dirichlet
prior over θ and act as a “pseudo-count” when data is sparse:




β(α, . . . ,α)
(3.3)
We typically choose the prior P(Pa) to penalize complex structures, as in equation (3.4)
which assigns a cost of ρ < 0.5 for each extra parent:
P(PaX) = ρ|PaX |(1−ρ)|X \PaX | (3.4)
3.1.1 Reducing the space of “Reasonable” Parent Sets
Unfortunately, evaluating the full posterior of (3.1), or even finding its maximum, is
infeasible for even a moderate number of variables, as the number of possible BNs is
hyper-exponential on the size of X (Tian and He, 2009). To tackle this, most methods
approximate Pa∗ via either local search (Teyssier and Koller, 2005), sampling methods
(Madigan et al., 1995), or by restricting the search space of structures to those considered
1Where the context is clear, we have compressed this notation to Nti| j
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reasonable, given evidence so far (Buntine, 1991). For our task, we have another issue—
most BN learning methods (with some notable exceptions (Buntine, 1991; Friedman
and Goldszmidt, 1997; Alcobe, 2005; Yasin and Leray, 2013)) operate once on a single
batch of data, and thus consider collecting the sufficient statistics (i.e., the BD-scores of
each PaX and their associated Ni| j) to be a negligible pre-computed cost. In a decision
problem however, agents gather data incrementally and exploit their current beliefs
during learning, so we must update the sufficient statistics at each time step.
To address these issues, we follow Buntine (1991) by constructing a reasonable parent
lattice PX for each X . Starting from /0, we construct larger parent sets by combining
sets seen so far, and track the highest scoring set according to (3.2). Any parent-set with
a score lower than some proportion κ of the best score is considered “unreasonable”,
and is not expanded further.2 This makes Buntine’s model defeasibly minimal, in the
sense that it assumes that adding further variables to an unreasonable parent set won’t
ever make it reasonable.
Figure 3.2 shows an example lattice for the possible parent sets of X1. Starting from
the empty set, the algorithm first computes the BD-scores of all size 1 parent sets—
{X2},{X3},{X4}, and {X5}. The BD-score of X5 falls below the threshold proportion
κ of the highest scoring parent set X2, so it is marked as “unreasonable” and not con-
sidered further. Next, the algorithm considers all size 2 combinations of the remaining
reasonable parent sets — {X2},{X3}, and {X4}. At this point, {X3,X4} falls below the
minimum threshold, and so is also marked as “unreasonable”. This process contin-
ues until either the lattice is fully expanded, or all remaining leaf nodes are marked
unreasonable.
3.1.2 Finding the Optimal Structure with ILP
Once we have our reduced set PX for each X , we can find the combination of reasonable
parent sets which maximize (3.1) and form a valid DAG. In our task, we will eventually
be learning X , so cannot assume we know a total-ordering ≺ over X (as Buntine (1991)
does), and thus cannot choose each Pa∗X independently. For instance, it might be that
{asia} is locally the most likely parent set for tub, and also that {tub} is the most likely
2In contrast to Buntine (1991), since we do not know ≺ in advance, we also consider all subsets of a
reasonable parent set to be reasonable. This makes it so it is always possible to construct at least one
valid DAG, regardless of how aggressively the search space is pruned.








Figure 3.2: Parent lattice for X1. Grey nodes are unreasonable
parent set for asia, but we cannot include both Patub = {asia} and Paasia = {tub} in
our final BN without creating a cycle.






I(PaX → X) ln[BD(X ,PaX)]
s.t. ∑
PaX∈PX




I(PaX → X)≥ 1 ∀C ⊆ X
I(PaX → X) ∈ {0,1} ∀X ,PaX
(3.5)
The variables I(PaX → X) denote whether we chose PaX as X’s parent set, while the
constraints ensure each X has only one parent set and that the parent sets form a DAG.
Once we have learned the most likely structure Pa∗, we can learn its most likely
parameters θ∗ via (3.6):
Eθ|D0:t ,Π(θi| j) =
Ni| j +αi| j
N.| j +α.| j
(3.6)
Our method has three main advantages. First, reducing the number of reasonable parent
sets and using the modular BD-score means we can incrementally update the probability
of each PaX using past calculations of (3.2) via (3.7):3
3We include a proof of (3.7) in the appendix.
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BDt(X ,PaX) = BDt−1(X ,PaX)
Nti| j +αi| j−1
Nt.| j +α.| j−1
(3.7)
Second, expressing structure learning as a linear program makes it easy to add extra
structural constraints later (as we do in Chapter 4). Third, each lattice PX implicitly
captures an approximate distribution over each X’s parents.4 The lattice in figure 3.2
for instance approximates the posterior distribution P(PaX1 |D0:t). In Section 3.2, the
agent uses this distribution to conserve information as its awareness of X expands.
Algorithm 1 gives an overview of how the agent updates its current beliefs about Pa∗
and θ∗ given the most recent trial dt . In most time steps, the agent simply incrementally
updates its previous sufficient statistics for each of the reasonable parent sets, then
chooses the combination of parent sets which maximizes the linear program given by
(3.5). However, if a significant amount of time τ has passed, we may wish to update
the set P of reasonable parent sets by re-running the lattice update method described in
Section 3.1.1
Algorithm 1 Updating BN (Fixed Belief Variables)
1: function UPDBN(P t−1,Nt−1i| j ,dt)
2: if t ≡ 0 (mod τ) then
3: Revise P t ,Nti, j, P(PaX |D0:t) via lattice update (Buntine, 1991) (threshold κ)
4: else
5: P t−1← P t
6: Nti, j← Update with dt ,N
t−1
i, j for all i ∈ v(X), j ∈ v(PaX),X ∈ X ,PaX ∈ P tX
7: P(PaX |D0:t)← Calculate via (3.7) for all PaX ∈ P tX ,X ∈ X
8: Pa∗←Maximize (3.5)
9: θ∗← Calculate via (3.6)
10: return 〈Nti, j,P t ,Pa∗,θ∗〉
3.2 Adapting to growing awareness
The previous sections assumed the learner was aware (in advance of learning) of the
full set of belief variables X which define the hypothesis space of possible BNs. In this
4Technically, without ≺, each PX is a distribution over markov blankets for X , but we enforce
acyclicity, so this is not an issue.







Time X1 X2 Z





t−1 1 0 ?
t 0 0 1
Table 3.1: View of data before and after discovering Z.
section, we drop this requirement.
As an example, suppose the learner is initially aware of only two variables: X 0 =
{X1,X2}, and X 0 ⊂ X +, where X + is the true set of variables. We assume the learner
cannot observe the value of variables it is unaware of. In the medicine example from
the introduction for instance, you wouldn’t be able to assess the presence or absence
of gene X if you were unaware that gene X even exists. As a consequence, this means
at time step 0, the learner observes d0[X 0]—the projection of d0 onto the variables in
X 0. Now suppose at time t, the learner discovers a new variable Z which they were
previously completely unaware of, meaning X t = X t−1∪{Z}. How should the learner
adapt its current beliefs about the likely structure and parameters of the problem to
accommodate this discovery?
The first problem is that the agent’s current distributions over possible parent sets no
longer cover all possible parent sets. For example, the current distribution over PaX1
does not include the possibility that Z is a parent of X1. Worse, since the agent cannot
observe Z’s past values in D0:t , it cannot observe Nt−kZ=i| j, or N
t−k
X=i| j when Z ∈ PaX
(0 < k ≤ t). The α-parameters involving Z are also undefined, and yet we need these
values to calculate structure probabilities via (3.7) and parameters via (3.6) in the
expanded hypothesis space.
Table 3.1 shows how introducing new variables makes the size of each (observed) state
dynamic, in contrast to standard learning problems where they are static. We could
try to phrase this as a missing data problem: Z was hidden in the past, but will be
visible in future states, so why not estimate the likely value of the missing data using
structural expectation maximization (Friedman, 1998)? However, such methods commit
us to expensive passes over the full batch of data (thus losing incrementality) and also
prevent us from decomposing the likelihood of a BN’s structure as combination of local
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parent-set probabilities.
Alternatively, we could just ignore states with missing information when counts involv-
ing the new variable are required. For example, we could use P(PaX1|Dt:n) to score
PaX1 when Z ∈ PaX1 but use P(PaX1|D0:n) when Z /∈ PaX1 . However, as Friedman and
Goldszmidt (1997) point out, Bayesian scores like (3.1) assume we are evaluating
models with respect to the same data. If two models are compared using different data
sets (even if they come from the same underlying distribution), the learner tends to
favour the model evaluated with the smaller amount of data (since we are typically
unable to compute the normalising factor P(D)). As such, comparing two models with
respect to different sets of data is an open problem.
Instead, our method discards the data D0:t−1 gathered during the learner’s previous
deficient view of the hypothesis space, but conserves the relative posterior probabilities
learned from the old, deficient view of the hypothesis space to construct a prior in the
expanded hypothesis space.
3.2.1 Structure Priors
We start by defining the distribution over the expanded set of parent sets. Upon
discovering the new variable Z at time t, the learner must update the distribution over
the parent sets PaX for each X 6= Z to include parent sets that include Z. Equation
(3.8) constructs a new prior Pt(PaX) using the old posterior (where C is a normalizing
constant):
Pt(PaX) = γPt(PaX |PX)+(1− γ)P0(PaX) (3.8)
Pt(PaX |PX) =
0 if PaX /∈ PX
(1−ρ)








This update preserves the relative likelihood among the parent sets that do not include
Z. It is also maintains our bias towards simpler structures by re-assigning only a small
proportion ρ of the probability mass of a parent set that does not include Z to the parent
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set formed by adding Z to it. To make this concrete, imagine that before discovering
Z, the agent believes {X2} ∈ PX1 and BDt−1(X1,{X2}) = 0.8, with ρ = 0.1. Upon
discovering Z, the agent will update its beliefs to Pt(PaX1 = {X2}|PX1) = 0.9∗0.8C and
Pt(PaX1 = {X2,Z}|PX1) = 0.1∗0.8C .
This still leaves us to define a distribution over PaZ—the possible parent sets of the
newly discovered variable Z. The learner has no evidence on Z’s parents at the moment
of Z’s discovery, so defaults to using the initial prior from (3.4).
3.2.2 Parameter Priors
To estimate the parameters θt , we return to the issue of the counts Ni| j and the associated
α-parameters. As before, we wish to avoid the complexity of estimating Z’s past
values. Instead, we throw away the past states D0:t−1 and their counts Nt−1i| j , but retain
the relative likelihoods they gave rise to by packing these into updated values for the
α-parameters, as shown in (3.10) (where K is a constant):












t−1) if Z ∈ PaX
K ∗P(i, j|θ∗t−1) otherwise
(3.10)
Equation (3.10) summarizes the counts from states D0:t based on inferences from the
previous best BN, then encodes these inferences in the α-parameters of the new pa-
rameter prior. Returning to the Asia example from figure 3.1, imagine we discover a
new binary variable—HIV , which we think might affect a patient’s chances of con-
tracting tuberculosis, and have K = 5. We would then set αttub=1|asia=1,HIV=1 equal to
5
2 ∗P(tub = 1,asia = 1) | θ
∗
t−1). These revised α-parameters ensure that the likelihoods
inferred from past states bias the estimated likelihoods of Pa and of θ when subsequent
states arrive. Indeed, the larger K is, the more conservative the learner will be: i.e.,
the more the probability distribution it learned before discovering Z will influence its
reasoning about dependencies and CPTs after discovering Z.
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Algorithm 2 Learn BN in Expanding Hypothesis Space
1: function LEARN BN(X 0)
2: Initialize P 0,Pa0 via Eq. (3.4)
3: N0i| j← 0 for all i, j,X ,ΠX
4: for t = 0 . . .maxTime do
5: if new variable Z discovered then
6: X t ← X t−1∪{Z}
7: Pt(PaX)← Update via (3.8) for all PaX ,X ∈ X t−1
8: Pt(PaZ)← Update via (3.4) for all PaZ
9: Nti| j,α
t
i| j ← Eq. (3.10) for all i, j,X ,ΠX
10: else
11: 〈X t ,P t ,Nti| j,α
t
i| j〉 ← 〈X
t−1,P t−1,Nt−1i| j ,α
t−1
i| j 〉
12: dt ← Generate new state
13: 〈Nti, j,P t ,Pat ,θt〉 ← UPDBN(P t ,Nti| j,dt)
14: return 〈Pat ,θt〉
3.2.3 Adapting the whole BN
Algorithm 2 outlines how the learner learns the structure and parameters of a BN
incrementally, despite being initially unaware of the full hypothesis space. If the set of
variables the learner is aware of remains stable, the learner updates its beliefs according
to the latest trial as in Algorithm 1. However, if the learner discovers a new variable,
then the learner uses equations (3.8) and (3.10) to conserve what it has learned so far
while expanding its view of the hypothesis space.
We evaluate the accuracy of the learner’s BN against the true BN by using a modified
version of the KL-Divergence between the two distributions:
DXKL(P ‖ Q) =
1











Equation (3.11) measures the similarity between distributions P and Q defined over
the sets of variables X P and X Q respectively. The closer DXKL(P ‖ Q) is to zero, the
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better the proposed distribution Q is at representing P. Unlike standard definitions of
KL-divergence, (3.11) explicitly specifies X —the set of variables defining the state-
space one is measuring over. This is because, in our task, distributions P and Q may
be defined over different sets of variables. Since the distributions do not distinguish
between states where the values of a variable X ′ /∈ X P (or X ′ /∈ X Q respectively) differ,
such differences must be marginalized out in the measurement.
If the interval between discovering new variables is large enough, the conservative
priors created in Algorithm 2 should always provide a more accurate estimate of
the true underlying distribution than a learner which abandons previously learned
information and instead reverts to an uninformative prior upon discovering a new
variable. Proposition 1 below formalizes this notion:
Let BN+ = P(X +|Pa+,θ+) be the distribution over X + given the true BN, and BNt =
P(X t |Pat ,θt) be the distribution over X t given the BN learned by an agent at time t
following algorithm 2.
Further, let k be the interval between new variable discoveries. If the nth variable
is discovered at time kn, let BNkn¬con = P(X kn|Pakn¬con,θkn¬con) be the distribution over
X kn given the BN learned a non-conservative learner— one which, upon discover-
ing a new variable, constructs new priors using (3.4), and by setting Ni| j = 0 and
αi| j = (|v(X ∪PaX)|)−1 for all X ,PaX , i, j. The following proposition holds:
Proposition 1. If DX knKL (BN




+ ‖ BNkN)≤ DX+KL (BN+ ‖ BNkN¬con)
Outline Proof. First note that for any X ′ ⊆ X +, and any two distributions PA and
PB defined over X ′, if DX
′
KL(BN
+ ‖ PA) ≤ DX
′
KL(BN
+ ‖ PB), then DX
+
KL (BN





Combined with our initial premise, this implies that the KL-divergence between BN+























The above proposition essentially states that (under certain conditions) conservativity
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ensures that on discovering a new variable, you start to learn within the newly expanded
hypothesis space with a bayesian network estimate that is closer to the true probabilistic
belief model than if you don’t adopt conservativity.
3.3 Experiments
Our experiments show that our method converges on an accurate model of the true BN’s
structure and parameters, even when the learner starts unaware of relevant variables.
Further, by conserving probabilistic information as the hypothesis space expands, our
learner maintains accurate models throughout learning, not just at the end of the learning
process (as predicted by Proposition 1).
Our primary evaluation metric is the KL-Divergence as defined in (3.11) over X+
between the true distribution P+ and the distribution Pt defined by the learner’s current
BN.
The other metric we use is to evaluate what the BD-Score (equation (3.1)) of the current
learned BN would have been given the full batch of data D0:T and full awareness X+.
This metric isolates how effective our algorithm is at discovering the inherent structure
of the data in isolation from the learned parameters by assessing how a fully aware
batch learner would rate the current BN.
We test our learner on four well-known BN learning problems: Asia (8 variables, 256
atomic states), Sachs (11 variables, 177147 atomic states), Child (20 variables, ≈ 109
atomic states), and Insurance (27 variables, ≈ 1013 atomic states). 5 Each experiment
runs over 10,000 trials that are generated from the true BN. This is repeated 10 times;
the results are averaged over these 10 simulations. For equations (3.4) and (3.8), we set
ρ = 0.1,γ = 0.99, and for (3.10) we set K = 5. We set the maximum parent-set size to
4, and the time interval and tolerance threshold for the Buntine lattice update to τ = 100
and κ = 0.001 respectively. When testing on a broad range of parameters, we found the
above settings yielded good results (and that changing those parameters did not appear
to alter the main findings reported below).
Our learner begins aware of just one variable (ie., |X 0|= 1), and is then introduced to
a new variable every 250 time steps (so the learner becomes fully aware of the entire
5Full specifications for each of the BNs above are available at
http://www.cs.huji.ac.il/˜galel/Repository/
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Figure 3.3: KL-Divergence of learned BNs from the true distributions
hypothesis space for Insurance, our largest BN, at state 6750).
We also compare our learner against two alternative models to test the effectiveness of
our assumptions. The non-conservative learner does not use equations (3.8) or (3.10) to
conserve information when a new variable is discovered, and instead discards previous
states and the probability distribution over BNs learned from them. This alternative
acts as a baseline model. Our upper-bound model, which we call the full-vocab learner,
starts out fully aware of the hypothesis space (i.e., X 0 = X+), but still has no knowledge
of the true structure or parameters.
3.3.1 Results
Our learner was able to learn an accurate model of the underlying distribution of all 4
BNs, despite being initially unaware of all but one of the variables in the true hypothesis
space. Figure 3.3 shows the KL-divergence between the true BN and the learner’s BN
at each time step. Notice that at any time step where a new variable is introduced, our
learner’s performance doesn’t degrade while the non-conservative agent’s performance
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Figure 3.4: BD-Score of learned BNs
degrades considerably before improving again.
The same is also true of the BD-score, as shown in Figure 3.4. This indicates that the
agent is able to learn a probabilistic structure which accurately reflects the underlying
dependencies present in the data. To illustrate, figure 3.5 gives a typical example of the
structure learned by the default agent on the Asia network. As can be seen, the learned
structure is often almost identical to the true underlying BN, with a few minor exceptions.
First, while the key probabilistic dependencies are captured, the learner is often unable
to distinguish the causal directionality of dependencies from passive observation alone:
for example, in figure 3.5b, there is a directed edge from lung cancer to smoking, rather
than the other way around. Another difference is that the agent tends not to commit to
dependencies for which there is too little data: as another example, in figure 3.5b, the
agent does not commit to the dependency between visits to Asia and tuberculosis, as
patients who have actually visited Asia are extremely rare (P(Asia = true) = 0.01).
One discrepancy to note is that, in the long period near the end of each experiment
where the learner experiences a large number of states under the full hypothesis space,
















(b) Default agent learned BN
Figure 3.5: Typical structure learned by default agent on Asia task
conservative learner. For example, at t = 10000, the (log) BDe-Score of the conservative
model is−1.345×105, while the non-conservative score is−1.328×105 (A difference
which is statistically significant for p = 1×10−10). There are two likely reasons for
this.
The first reason is that, given enough data, the data alone provides a fairly strong
estimate of the structure and parameters of the true model. A learner with a highly
concentrated prior which makes minor errors (i.e., the prior that the conservative learner
constructs via (3.8)) will take longer to move towards a model favoured by the data than
one with a prior which makes broad uniform predictions.
The second related issue is that while a prior with structural modularity like the BD-
score (i.e., a structural prior which can be decomposed into the sum of priors of
each variable’s parent set) makes learning tractable, it potentially incorrectly penalizes
structures which are actually quite close to the true BN. For example, consider an agent
that is currently aware of two variables—X and Y —and thinks the mostly likely BN
structure is Y → X . Upon discovering a new variable Z, an agent using equation (3.8)
to construct its new prior will initially rate the structure Z → Y → X as higher than
the structure Y → Z→ X . In subsequent chapters, where the agent has direct control
over action variables, or in sequential problems where the agent knows that one set of
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variables always occurs before another set, such issues present less of a problem, as the
agent has additional ordering information to guide its assessments.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have provided a method to learn both the structure and parameters of
a Bayesian Network, even when lifting the common assumption the learner is aware
of all relevant belief variables in advance. Through experimentation on several well-
known Bayesian Networks, we have demonstrated that by conserving previously learned
information about structure and parameters, the learner is able to quickly converge on
an accurate model of the problem upon discovery of new variables in the hypothesis
space.
This chapter provides the groundwork for how to adapt a learner’s existing beliefs once
a new variable is discovered, but the explicit mechanisms of how such discoveries take
place was left unspecified. In the next chapter we elaborate on how such discoveries
can be made via conversations with an expert by specifying a dialogue protocol for two
agents with differing levels of awareness about the underlying problem. Further, we
expand our scope to problems where the agent must take actions within the environment,
rather than just passively observing it.
Chapter 4
Structured Decision Problems with
Unawareness
In this chapter, we move from models of belief to decision tasks, where the agent can
take actions and receive rewards. Our agent learns how to behave optimally by learning
a Bayesian Decision Network (DN): i.e., an extension of a Bayesian Networks with
action and a utility (reward) nodes (see Section 4.1.1 for full definition). Once again,
we start with an explanation of how the agent learns such models when it is fully aware
of all relevant factors, then go on to describe how the agent can learn optimal behaviour
when it starts unaware of the true set of belief and action variables, or the scope of the
reward function.
The other main contribution of this chapter is to describe the mechanism by which
the agent overcomes its own unawareness. In the previous chapter, the agent simply
“became aware” of previously unforeseen variables at regular intervals during learning.
In this chapter, we model a scenario closer to human teacher-apprentice learning,
where an agent becomes aware of previously unforeseen actions and belief variables
via discussion with an informed expert. This discussion uses an interaction policy
with dialogue moves which would be quite natural in human teaching and learning
environments.
A key point that is emphasised throughout this chapter is that we can now think of
evidence from both domain trials and expert assistance as giving not only information
about the relative counts of each state, but also monotonic information about the true DN
in the form of a partial description. This means our agent must ensure that its current
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model is valid in the sense that it is consistent with all such partial descriptions gathered
so far. In the typical case where the agent is fully-aware of the hypothesis space, such
validity is not much of a concern—the agent simply has to ensure that their current
model is well formed (i.e., that their current model is a directed, acyclic graph). In the
unaware case however, the agent must deal with validity in another sense— it must
ensure that its current model is actually capable of producing the evidence it has seen
so far. As we will see, if the current evidence is inconsistent with the agent’s current
estimate of the hypothesis space, the agent must detect this fact and fix it to overcome
its own unawareness.
The focus of this chapter is on single-step decision tasks. That is, scenarios in which
the agent takes an action based on some initial observations and immediately receives
a final reward based on the outcome of this action. Any repetitions of the task are
not dependent on one another. In the next chapter, we expand our model to handle
sequential decision tasks, where the agent’s actions in previous steps may affect the
relative likelihood of outcomes of future actions, and hence also of potential future
rewards.
4.1 Optimal Behaviour with Full Awareness
In a single stage decision problem, an agent observes some evidence e about its envi-
ronment, takes some action a, then receives some immediate reward R (s) depending
on the state s which resulted from their action.
Our agent’s goal is to learn the policy π+ which, given evidence e, always chooses the







If P(s|a,e) or the reward function R are unknown, the agent must learn them via trial
and error. Our agent can balance exploiting its current estimate of the best policy—
π∗—with exploring the domain by using an ε-greedy policy. An ε-greedy policy is one
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where, in all states, the agent acts randomly with probability ε > 0, and acts according
to π∗ with probability 1− ε.
Further, for any policy π, we can measure the expected loss in reward against the true




Unfortunately, if there are a large number of states, then evaluating the expected utility
directly is often intractable. To make the problem tractable, we exploit the inherent
structure of complex decision problems by learning a bayesian decision network.
4.1.1 Bayesian Decision Networks
A Bayesian Decision Network (DN) (Russell and Norvig, 2002) is a BN augmented with
actions and rewards. It is a tuple:
〈A ,X ,R ,Pa,θ〉 (4.4)
Here, A = {A1, . . . ,Am} are the action variables the agent controls (where a full action a
is a member of v(A)). As before, X are the belief variables, but they are now partitioned
into X = B ∪O (B ∩O = /0), where B is the set of variables the agent observes before
taking action, and O are the variables which describe the outcome of that action. The
reward function R : v(scope(R ))→R gives the reward received in each state, where
scope(R ) ⊆ X are the variables which determine the reward.1 The terms Pa and θ
still describe the structure and effect of probabilistic dependencies (as in the definition
of BNs), but now each PaX can also include both belief and action variables (i.e.,
∀X ,PaX ⊂ X ∪A).
As the agent takes actions within the domain, it gathers domain trials D0:t = {d0, . . . ,dt}.
A domain trial at time t is a tuple:
1To restrict the scope of this thesis, we assume that, given full knowledge of the true decision problem,
the agent’s preferences are deterministic on values of some subset of the outcome variables. We also
assume the agent does not have a preference for particular actions, but only a preference for the outcomes
that those actions bring about.










Figure 4.1: DN for medical example. Rectangles are action variables, ovals are belief
variables, and diamonds are reward nodes
dt = 〈st ,at ,rt〉 (4.5)
Where st = 〈bt ,ot〉,bt ∈ v(B),ot ∈ v(O),at ∈ v(A), and rt = R (st).
Figure 4.1 shows an example DN. Here, the agent chooses assignments for action
variables TOPICAL CREAM and ORAL DRUG based on observing GENE X, then
receives a reward based on outcomes DISEASE, and SIDE EFFECTS. We note that
DNs are essentially a subset of the notation used for influence diagrams (Howard and
Matheson, 2005). Influence diagrams add information arcs from belief variables to
action variables, which show the variables in B that the agent observes before choosing
values for each A ∈ A . For simplicity of explanation, we omit information arcs, and
instead assume all action variables are set simultaneously, with access to observations
of all variables in B .
4.1.2 Learning the Probabilistic Dependencies
To learn the most likely probabilistic structure and parameters—Pa∗ and θ∗, we can
simply reuse the same technique of maximizing the ILP problem (3.5), and computing
the expected parameters via (3.6) as in Chapter 3. The only differences are that we must
add a few additional constraints to the types of structure that constitute a valid DN. For
example, the action nodes are not permitted to have any parents, and the “before” nodes
can only have other “before” nodes as parents (that is ∀B ∈ B,PaB ⊂ B).
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4.1.3 Learning the Reward Function
Given full awareness of X and scope(R ), learning a valid reward function which
conforms to the evidence seen in domain trials D0:t is relatively straightforward. For
each state si that occurs in D0:t , Rt(si) = ri. For unseen states, we default to indifference
(e.g., by setting the reward of unseen states to 0). In the next section, we will see that
when partial unawareness is introduced, this constraint solving problem becomes more
complex.
Given a learned DN, the agent can then choose a policy π∗ which maximizes the expected
utility equation 4.1, where a ∈ v(A) and e ∈ v(B).
4.2 Overcoming Unawareness with Expert Guidance
So far, we’ve assumed our agent was aware of all relevant variables in X ∪A and all
members of scope(R ). We now drop this assumption. From here onward (as in the
previous chapter), we denote the true set of belief variables, actions, and reward scope
by X +,A+, and scope+(R ); we denote the learner’s awareness of them at time t by X t ,
A t , and scopet(R ).
Suppose X + = {X1,X2}, X0 = {X1}, A+ = {A1,A2}, A t = {A1}. We assume the agent
can’t observe the value of variables it is unaware of. Additionally, we assume that an
agent cannot observe the value of a variable at a past time at which it was unaware of
it, even after becoming aware of it. In the medical example from the introduction, if
X2 is particular gene, we assume the agent cannot detect the presence of that gene if it
is unaware it exists. The agent also cannot have preferences that are dependent on the
gene: there is no de-re preference without de-re belief (Cadilhac et al., 2015). We also
assume the agent cannot perform actions it is unaware of (i.e., if the agent is unaware of
variable A2 then it cannot set it to a value other than its default value A2 = 0).2 This
means at time t = 0, the agent does not observe the true trial d0, but rather, its projection
onto X 0 and A0:
〈s0[X 0],a0[A0],r0〉 (4.6)
2This assumption, while reasonable, may not always hold (E.g., an agent may accidentally lean on a
button while unaware that the button is part of the task).
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But awareness of those missing factors may be crucial to learning π+. For example, the
best action may depend upon whether X2 is true, or the optimal policy may sometimes
involve setting A2 to a value other than its default.
The following sections thus answer two main questions. First, how can an agent discover
and overcome its own unawareness? Second, when an agent discovers a new variable,
how can they integrate it into their current model while conserving what they have
learned from past experience?
Overcoming unawareness will be down to a combination of two factors: certain infer-
ences on the part of the learner, which can be summarised roughly as “I’m stuck”, and
which prompt a question whose possible answers will help the learner overcome their
current dilemma, and unsolicited advice from the expert, which in turn occurs when
the learner has been performing the task sufficiently poorly. These are quite natural
kinds of moves one would expect in a scenario where a teacher is interacting with an
apprentice, as the apprentice attempts domain-level actions to solve their task.
4.2.1 Expert Guidance
Our agent can expand its awareness via advice from an expert. Teacher-apprentice
learning is common in the real world, as it allows learners to receive contextually
relevant advice which may inform them of unforeseen concepts.
This thesis assumes the expert is cooperative, sincere and infallible. Further, we
abstract away from the complexity of grounding natural language statements in a formal
semantics and instead assume that the agent and expert communicate via a pre-specified
formal language (though see e.g., Zettlemoyer and Collins (2007) for work on this
problem). We do not, however, assume the expert knows the agent’s beliefs about the
DN.
The formal language used for communication is effectively one in which each well-
formed formula δ acts as a partial description of the true DN, dn+ (formally, dn+  δ).
In other words, when the agent asks a question, the answer will be a partial description
of the true DN, and when the expert gives unsolicited advice, this will also be a partial
description of the true DN. The model theory of this language is given in the Appendix:
roughly speaking, each model corresponds to a unique DN, and a model satisfies a
formula of this language if and only if that formula is a partial description of the DN.
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We use the variables X e and Ae to express the expert’s current knowledge of our
agent’s awareness (where by “knowledge”, we mean that the expert has concrete and
indefeasible evidence that the agent is aware of the variable; the expert does not build
a belief model of the agent’s awareness, probabilistic or otherwise). An action A only
becomes a member of Ae if the expert has observed the agent setting A to a non-default
value in a past trial, or if the expert has explicitly mentioned A to the agent in a previous
piece of advice. Likewise, a variable X only becomes a member of X e when either the
expert or agent has explicitly mentioned it in a previous piece of dialogue.
As argued in Chapter 1, the goal is to provide a minimal set of communicative acts so
that interaction between the agent and expert resembles dialogue moves that would be
quite natural in a human teacher-apprentice interaction.
Concretely, this means we want our system to have two properties. First, the expert
should mostly allow the agent to learn by themselves, interjecting only when the agent
performs sufficiently poorly, or when they explicitly ask a question. Second, our expert
should be able to give non-exhaustive answers to queries. This is because, in practice, it
is unlikely a human expert will be able to give exhaustive answers to all questions due to
either cognitive bounds or a lack of information. Following the maxims of Grice (1975),
a cooperative speaker should give answers which provide just enough information to
resolve the agent’s current dilemma.
We identify four types of advice, whose combination guarantee the agent eventually
behaves optimally, regardless of initial awareness.
4.2.1.1 Better Action Advice
If the expert sees the agent perform a sub-optimal action, it can tell the agent a better
action to take instead. For example: “When it is raining, take your umbrella instead of
your sun hat”. Our goal is to avoid interrupting the agent every time it makes a mistake,
so we specify the following conditions for when the agent performs poorly enough
to warrant correction: Let t be the current time step, and t ′ be the time the expert last
uttered advice. When (4.7-4.11) hold:
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EU(at |bt)≥ rt (4.9)
∃A ′,a′ ∈ v(Ae∪A ′),EU(a′|bt)> EU(at |bt) (4.10)
@A
′′
,(a′′ ∈ v(Ae∪A ′′),EU(a′′|bt)> E(at |bt)
∧ |A ′′|< |A ′|)
(4.11)
Then the expert will utter advice of the form (4.12):
EU(a′|wbt )> EU(at [A t ∪A ′]|wbt ) (4.12)
Equation (4.7) ensures some minimum time µ has passed since the expert last gave
advice, while (4.8) ensures the expert won’t interrupt unless its estimate of the agent’s
policy error is above some threshold β. Together, µ and β define how tolerant the expert
will be to the agent’s poor performance before deciding to give advice. Equation (4.9)
ensures that the expert’s suggested action has an expected reward higher than what
the agent received at time t. Finally, (4.10-4.11) ensure not only that a better action
a′ exists, but also that a′ introduces the minimum amount of potentially unforeseen
action variables A ′ needed to improve the agent’s behaviour. This means there isn’t
another action a′′ which could be advised while revealing fewer unaware variables to the
agent. This follows from our desire to give non-exhaustive advice, by first suggesting
improvements which use concepts the agent is already aware of, rather than introducing
many new action variables all at once.
Equation (4.12)—the expert’s utterance—requires explanation. On first thought, the
expert should utter:
EU(a′|bt)> EU(at |bt) (4.13)
which fully describes bt . But remember that the agent’s awareness B t may be a tiny
subset of B+. Uttering such advice may involve revealing many variables the agent
is currently unaware of. This is exactly the type of cognitively-taxing exhaustive
explanation we wish to avoid.
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Alternatively, the expert could restrict the description to X e, but this could make
the advice false: there may exist a b′ 6= bt where b′[X e] = bt [X e], but EU(at |b′) >
EU(a′|b′).
To address this issue, the expert uses a sense-ambiguous term wb, whose intended
meaning is the true state b (i.e JwbK ∈ v(B+), where JyK is the denotation of y), but
whose default interpretation by the agent is b[B t ]. In words, the expert says “In that
last situation, a′ would have been a better action than at”, which implicitly makes
reference to the state of the world in the previous time step.
By introducing ambiguity, the agent can now interpret (4.12) in two ways. The first is
as a partial description of the true DN (dn+), which is true regardless of what it learns
in future. More formally, if δ is the partial description given by the current piece of
dialogue (or domain) evidence, then dn+  δ. 3
On hearing (4.12), the agent adds (4.14-4.15) to its list of partial descriptions of the true
DN:
∀A ∈ A ′,A ∈ A+∧∃X ∈ scope+(R ),anc(A,X) (4.14)
∃s,s[B t ] = st [B t ]∧R+(s)> rt (4.15)
Where anc(X ,Y ) means X is the ancestor of Y (i.e., there is a directed path from X to Y
in the true DN):
anc(X ,Y ) = X ∈ PaY ∨ (∃Z,X ∈ PaZ ∧anc(Z,Y )) (4.16)
Equations (4.14-4.15) imply that any variable the expert utters must be relevant to the
problem. In other words, it must exert influence on at least one variable in scope+(R ),
and that there exists some state the agent could have reached which would yield a better
reward than the one it got. In fact, we can enforce all equations of the form (4.14) when
learning Pa∗ by adding the constraint (4.17) to our linear program:
∀Y /∈ scope(R ) : ∑
X∈X
PaX :Y∈PaX
I(PaX → X)≥ 1 (4.17)
3A full specification of syntax and semantics used to partially describe DNs is given in the appendix
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The second way the agent could use (4.12) is by adding its default interpretation of the
advice to its current knowledge:
∀b ∈ B+ : b[B t ] = bt [B t ]⇒ EU(a′|b)> EU(a|b) (4.18)
The agent can then enforce (4.18) by choosing a′ whenever b[B t ] = bt [B t ], regardless of
what seems likely from D0:t . We should now see that even with a cooperative, infallible
expert, even abstracting away issues of grounding natural language, misunderstandings
can still happen due to differences in agent and expert awareness. As the next section
shows, such misunderstandings can reveal gaps in the agent’s awareness and help to
articulate queries whose answers guarantee the agent expands its awareness.
Lemma 1 guarantees the expert’s advice strategy continues to reveal unforeseen actions
to the agent so long as its performance in trials exceeds the expert’s tolerance.
Lemma 1. Consider an agent with awareness At ⊂ A+, and expert following (4.7-4.12).
As k→ ∞, either Err(πt+k)→ c≤ β or the expert utters (4.12) where A ′ 6= /0.
Proof. For finite µ, (t + k)− t ′ > µ as k→ ∞, satisfying (4.7).
Given A t remains fixed, the agent’s policy will eventually converge to some policy π. If
Err(π)< β, we are done. If Err(π)≥ β, then (4.8) will be satisfied.
Since the agent is ε-greedy, at every time step it has a non-zero probability of performing
all actions a ∈ v(At), meaning that eventually Ae = A t . Further, since π 6= π+, there
must exist some b ∈ v(B+) and a′ ∈ v(A+) such that ∀a ∈ A t ,EU(a′|b) > EU(a|b),
thereby satisfying (4.10).
Since the agent is ε-greedy, it is guaranteed to eventually perform a∗= argmaxa∈v(A t)EU(a|b)
in in state b, thus making (4.11) true for a non-empty value of A ′.
(4.7-4.11) are not mutually exclusive, so all four will eventually be true at once, causing
the expert to utter (4.12) for non-empty A ′.
4.2.1.2 Resolving a Misunderstanding
We noted before that the agent’s default interpretation of (4.12) could lead it to misun-
derstand the expert’s intended meaning. To illustrate, suppose the agent receives advice
(4.19) and (4.20) at times t− k and t:
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EU(a|wbt−k)> EU(a
′|wbt−k) (4.19)
EU(a|wbt )< EU(a′|wbt ) (4.20)
While the intended meaning of each statement is true, the agent’s default interpretations
of wst−k and w
s
t may be identical. That is, bt−k[B t ] = bt [B t ]. From the agent’s perspec-
tive, (4.19) and (4.20) conflict, and thus give the agent a clue that its current awareness
of X + is deficient. To resolve this conflict, the agent asks (4.21) (in words, “which B
has distinct values in bt−k and bt?”) and receives an answer which provides monotonic
information of the form (4.22-4.23):
?λB(B ∈ B+∧ st−k[B] 6= st [B]) (4.21)
B′ ∈ B+ (4.22)
B′ /∈ scope+(R ) =⇒ ∃X ∈ scope+(R ),anc(B′,X) (4.23)
Notice there may be many variables in B+ \B t whose assignments differ in bt−k and bt .
Thus, the expert’s answer can be non-exhaustive. This means the agent must abandon
its previous defeasible interpretations of the form (4.18), but can keep (4.14-4.15), as
these are true regardless of what the true DN is. Lemma 2 guarantees the expert will
eventually reveal new belief variables as long as the agent’s current awareness is such
that misunderstandings are still possible.
Lemma 2. Consider an agent with awareness X t ⊂ X +, A t = A+. If ∃b′,∃b 6=
b′,b[B t ] = b′[B t ] and π+(b) 6= π+(b′), then as k→ ∞, either Err(πt+k)→ c ≤ β, or
the expert utters (4.22) such that B′ /∈ B t
Proof. If the agent converges to some policy π such that Err(π)≤ β, we are done.
Assume a = π+(b) and a′ = π+(b′). Consider that for all k, P(bt+k = b)> 0, and (since
the agent is ε-greedy) P(πt+k(b) = a′)> 0, where a′ = π+(b′).
If Err(π) ≥, then at some time t + k1 where (t + k1)− t ′ > µ and bt+k1 = b the agent
will perform a′, thus satisfying (4.7-4.11) and causing the expert to utter EU(a|wbt+k1)>
EU(a′|wbt+k1).
By similar reasoning, at some time bt+k2 = b
′ the expert will utter EU(a′,wbt+k2) >
EU(a,wbt+k2).
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Under B t , Jwst+k1K = Jw
s
t+k2
K, so the agent will ask (4.21) with answer B /∈ B t .
4.2.1.3 Unforeseen Rewards
In typical DNs (where we assume the agent starts fully aware of X +,A+, and scope+(R )),
we tend only to think of the trials as providing counts. For an unaware agent, a trial
dt = 〈st ,at ,rt〉 also encodes monotonic information:
∃s,s[X t ] = st [X t ]∧R+(s) = rt (4.24)
This, along with (4.15), constrain the form of R the agent can learn. Recall that
scopet(R ) may be only a subset of scope+(R ), so it might be impossible to construct
an R : v(scopet(R ))→ R satisfying all descriptions of the form (4.24) and (4.15)
gathered so far. Further, those extra variables in scope+(R )\ scopet(R ) may not be
in X t . To resolve this, if the agent fails to construct a valid R , it asks (4.25) (in words,
“which variable X (that I don’t already know) is in scope(R )?”), receiving an answer of
the form (4.26):
?λX(X ∈ scope+(R )
∧
X ′∈scopet(R )
X 6= X ′) (4.25)
X ′′ ∈ scope+(R )∧X ′′ ∈ X+ (4.26)
Again (4.26) may be non-exhaustive. Even so, Lemma 3 guarantees that the agent’s
reward function eventually equals R+.
Lemma 3. Consider an ε-greedy agent with awareness A t =A+, scopet(R )⊆ scope+(R ).
As k→ ∞, there exists a K such that ∀s,∀k ≥ K, Rt+k(s) = R+(s).
Proof. Since A t = A+, and the agent is ε-greedy, then over infinite time the agent will
eventually enter s at some time i, receiving reward R+(s), and update its current reward
function so that Ri(s) = R+(s). If the agent has previously encountered another s′ such
that s[scopet(R )] = s′[scopet(R )] and R+(s) 6= R+(s′), the partial descriptions (4.24)
for s and s′ will conflict. The agent resolves this by asking (4.25), receiving an answer
differentiating s from s′ in R+.
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4.2.1.4 Unknown effect
Recall that, to keep the problem tractable, our agent searches for DNs in the space
of “reasonable” parent sets P . Unfortunately, there might be no valid DN within P
which also satisfies the constraints of the form (4.17). The most obvious case of
this is when a variable X /∈ scopet(R ) has no children in any reasonable DAG (i.e.,
∀Y,∀PaY ∈ PY ,X /∈ PaY ).4 Here, the agent can ask why X is relevant by asking (4.27)
(“what V does X affect directly?”):
?λV (X ∈ PaV ) (4.27)
In response, the expert answers with the name of a variable V ′ which X directly affects:
X ∈ PaV ′ (4.28)
Which imparts the monotonic partial description (4.29-4.31) to the agent:
V ′ ∈ X + (4.29)
X ∈ PaV ′ (4.30)
V ′ /∈ scope+(R ) =⇒ ∃Y ∈ scope+(R ),anc(V ′,Y ) (4.31)
This advice guarantees that the agent which prunes the set of reasonable parents for
each variable will always be able to construct a valid DN, provided its list of reasonable
parents obey the partial descriptions given by (4.30).
4.3 Adapting to Advice with Unforeseen Factors
Section 4.2.1 showed four ways to expand its awareness of X , A , and scope(R ). To
improve on simply restarting learning, we must now say how the agent adapts its beliefs
about Pa and θ when its awareness expands.
4More generally, this can occur whenever there is no directed path from X to scope(R ) via the union
of all members of P
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4.3.1 Adding a new belief variable
As covered in Chapter 3, when the agent discovers a new belief variable Z at time t, its
old distributions over parent sets no longer cover all possible parents. Further, the agent
cannot go back and observe Z’s past values in D0:t−1. Our approach to handling this
issue remains unchanged from Chapter 3—the agent creates new priors for Pa and θ in
the expanded space using equations (3.8) and (3.10) respectively.
4.3.2 Adding a new action variable
When the agent discovers a new action variable A, the same issue arises—the agent
did not consider A as a possible parent to any X ∈ X t−1, so must revise P with A as a
possibility. Unlike for belief variables, however, we don’t need to discard D0:t−1. Since
we assume that the agent cannot influence action variables it is unaware of, we can
simply fill in the default value of A in all past trials D0:t−1.
4.3.3 Expanding the reward function scope
Learning that a variable X is in the scope of R may cause us to revise Pa∗, even if
X ∈ X t−1. This is because expanding scopet(R ) loosens the constraints of the form
(4.17) which may allow us to construct a higher scoring DN structure that was previously
invalid.
4.3.4 The Overall Learning Process
Algorithm 3 outlines the entire learning process described throughout the previous
sections. In most steps, the agent incrementally revises its model based on the latest
trial and current reasonable parents. If enough time τ passes, or the agent’s awareness
expands, the agent makes larger changes to its model, including revising P .
Given algorithm 3, Theorem 1 guarantees our agent is eventually able to learn all the
action and state variables which are relevant to expressing an optimal policy, regardless
of initial awareness. Further, if the structure learning stage does not prune true depen-
dencies from P (which we can ensure by setting κ = 0), then the agent is guaranteed to
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Algorithm 3 Learning DNs with Unawareness
1: Input: A0, X 0, Pa0, θ0, P 0
2: for t = 1 . . .maxTrials do
3: bt ← Generate new state
4: 〈ot ,at ,rt〉 ← ε-GREEDY(bt [X t ])
5: Nti| j← Update with bt [X
t ],ot [X t ] for all i, j
6: BDt(X ,PaX)← Update via (3.7) for PaX ∈ PX
7: if t ≡ 0 (mod τ) then
8: Revise P t via (Buntine, 1991) lattice update
9: if Exists X with no path to reward via P t then
10: Ask (4.27) and update X t , P t
11: R t ← Update with constraints (4.24, 4.15)
12: if Update to Rt fails then
13: Ask (4.21) and update scopet(R ),X t ,P t
14: if (4.7-4.11) are true then
15: actAdvice← Expert advises (4.12)
16: Update A t , P t according to actAdvice
17: if actAdvice conflicts with past utterances then
18: Ask (4.21) and update X t ,P t
19: if X t−1 6= X t then
20: Update Nti| j,αi| j,P ,P(Pa) via (3.4, 3.8, 3.10)
21: 〈Pat ,θt〉 ← Solve (3.5) (with (added constraints 4.17)), and (3.6)
converge on a policy which is within some bound of the true optimal policy for the task.
This bound is dictated by β - the expert’s tolerance for the agent’s mistakes.
Theorem 1. Consider an agent with initial awareness X 0⊆X +,A0⊆A+,scope0(R )⊆
scope+(R ) following algorithm 3 (with κ = 0). As t→ ∞, Err(πt)→ c≤ β.
Proof. By repeatedly applying Theorems 1-3, either Err(πt)→ c≤ β (in which case we
are done), or there exists a K where AK = A+, RK = R+, and X K = Bk∪OK . Here, BK
contains all variables B ∈B+ such that there exist b, and b′ where b[B+\B] = b′[B+\B]
but b[B] 6= b′[B] and π+(b) 6= π+(b′). In other words, 〈X K,AK,R K〉 define a related
decision problem with an identical optimal policy and marginal probability distribution
to the original problem, but for which the agent is fully aware.
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The BD-score is a consistent score, which means that as |D| → ∞, Pa∗ contains all
dependencies present in the true distribution, regardless of initial prior (assuming we
have not over-pruned the search space, which is true in this case because κ = 0). As
a result, as t → ∞, then ∀a ∈ v(A+), ∀b ∈ BK , ∀y ∈ v(scope+(R )), we have that
P(y|a,b,Pa∗t ,θ∗t )→ P(y|a,b,Pa+,θ+).
Since our agent’s probabilistic model converges to the true probabilistic distribution,
and because R K = R + and AK = A+, we have that π∗t → π+ and therefore that
Err(π∗t )→ 0
We can also guarantee that an agent following algorithm 3 produces a DN at each time
step which is consistent with all partial descriptions gathered from evidence so far:
Theorem 2. Let δ0:t be the conjunction of all partial descriptions gathered up to time
step t. An agent following algorithm 3 is guaranteed to produce a DN at time step t
such that dnt  δ0:t .
Outline proof. δ0:t contains four kinds of conjuncts:
(i) X ∈ X+,X ∈ A+,X ∈ B+,X ∈ O+,X ∈ scope+(R )
(ii) X ∈ PaY
(iii) ∃s,s[Y ] = si[Y ] such that either R+(s)> ri (as in equation (4.15)) or R+(s) = ri
(as in equation (4.24))
(iv) ∃Y ∈ scope+(R ),anc(X ,Y )
Lines 10, 13, 16, and 18 ensure that conjuncts of type (i) are satisfied, as the agent
immediately updates the sets X t ,A t ,B t ,Ot, and scopet(R ) on receipt of such evidence.
Each conjunct of type (ii) is satisfied by directly including a constraint of the form
∑
PaY :X∈PaY
I(X → PaY ) = 1 in the ILP-maximization at step 21. Alternatively, we can
satisfy this constraint earlier by setting the probability of any PaY for which X /∈ PaY to
0 in steps 6 and 8.
Conjuncts of type (iii) are explicitly used as constraints in computing a valid reward
function in step 11. If it is not possible for the agent to generate a valid reward function
satisfying all type (iii) constraints given its current view of the hypothesis space, then
the evidence received in step 13 will ensure the hypothesis space expands in such a way
as to guarantee a valid reward function (see Lemma 3).
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Conjuncts of type (iv) are satisfied in the ILP-step. The combination of the three
constraints listed in equation (3.5) guarantee the agent will output a parent structure
which is a directed-acyclic graph (see Bartlett and Cussens (2017) for details). The
additional constraint (4.17) ensures that every variable which is not in the scope of the
reward function must have at least one child. By definition, if a directed graph is acyclic
and every non-reward node has at least one child node, then there must exist a path
from every non-reward node to at least one reward node, thus satisfying all conjuncts of
type (iv). Further, if it is not possible to construct such a graph given the current set of
reasonable parents P , then the agent will ask 4.27, whose answer will provide the name
of a variable which is the child of a (currently childless) variable.
4.4 Experiments
Our experiments show that agents following algorithm 3 converge to true optimal policy
in practice, even when using a heuristic which attempts to minimize complexity. We
also show that conserving information improves results. We do not investigate assigning
explicit costs to agent-expert communication, but do show how varying the expert’s
tolerance affects the agent’s performance.
We tested agents on two different types of task. The first was a manually constructed
decision network called the barley problem (inspired by Kristensen and Rasmussen
(2002)). This is a decision problem modelled on crop-farming, in which the agent
must decide on factors such as which grain to plant and how much fertiliser to use,
with the goal of producing a harvest with high yields of healthy (high protein) crops.5
Figure 4.2 shows an illustration of the barley DN. In each experiment, our agent
begins with a simplified awareness of the problem: X 0 = {Yield, Protein, Gross Crops,
Nitrogen, Precipitation, Soil Type }, A0 = {Grain,Fertiliser}, and scope0(R ) =
{Yield,Protein}. In other words, the agent starts out unaware of 56% of the factors that
define the optimal policy in this domain. This task was explicitly designed such that the
agent cannot achieve the optimal policy without considering factors which it is initially
unaware of. For instance, in hot weather, the agent should apply fungicide to crops to
prevent fungus outbreaks, but the agent is initially unaware that the concept of fungus
is even an issue.
5Full specifications for all DNs are included in the appendix























Figure 4.2: Barley DN
We also tested agents on three randomly generated DNs of increasing size: 12, 24,
and 36 variables. In each, our agent begins with minimal awareness of the true DN
(X 0 = {O1},A0 = {A1}, scope0(R ) = {O1}).
In both sets of experiments the agent acts in T trials, using an ε-greedy policy (ε = 0.1).
We repeat experiments 50 times and average the results.
We use the cumulative reward across trials as our main evaluation metric, which acts
as a proxy for the quality of the agent’s policy over time. To make the results more
readable, we apply a discount of 0.99 at each step, resulting in the metric:
Rdisct = rt +0.99∗Rdisct−1 (4.32)
We test several variants of our agent to show our approach is effective. The default
agent follows algorithm 3 as is, with parameters κ = 0.001, τ = 100, ρ = 0.1, γ = 0.99,
K = 5.0, µ = 10, β = 0.01 in equations (3.4), (4.7), (4.8), (3.8), and (3.10). The
nonConservative agent does not conserve information about P , Pa, nor θ via (3.8)
or (3.10) when it discovers a new factor. Instead, it discards all trials and reverts to
the original prior of (3.4). We include this agent to show the value of conserving
information as X and A expand. The non-relevant agent is like the default, but does
not include any constraints of the form (4.17) when searching for Pa∗. This means the
agent might learn DNs where variables are completely disconnected. The truePolicy
and random agents start knowing the true DN, and execute an ε-greedy version of
π+, or choose a random action respectively. These agents give an upper/lower bound
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Figure 4.3: Rewards of each agent on Barley DN (T = 1000). Shaded areas represent
standard error from the mean.
on performance. The lowTolerance and highTolerance agents change the expert’s
tolerance to β = 0.001 and β = 0.1. On the largest DN (36 variables), we also run a
few additional tests: the uniform-prior agent replaces the cost of additional parents
in equation (3.4) to ρ = 0.5, while the no-pruning agent replaces the threshold for
reasonable parents in the Buntine lattice update to κ = 0.0. These tests were included
to verify the benefits of the principle of minimality (as briefly discussed in Section 1.3
of the introduction). In other words, the notion that favouring simpler models over
complex ones should result in faster learning times without harming the quality of the
learned DN.
4.4.1 Results and Discussion
Across all tasks, our default agent converges to the optimal policy, despite starting
unaware of factors critical to success. Figures 4.3, 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 show the cumulative
(discounted) rewards gathered by the default agent compared to the non-conservative,
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Figure 4.4: Size of X and A on Barley DN

































































Figure 4.5: Cumulative rewards for Small DN (12 variables, T = 1000 trials)
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Figure 4.6: Cumulative rewards for Medium DN (24 variables, T = 1500 trials)
non-relevant, true-policy, high-tolerance, and low-tolerance agents. The default agent
converges to the optimal policy, and does so faster than its non-conservative counterpart.
This difference is most pronounced in the large DN task, where the agent is required to
expand its awareness to a greater number of unforeseen actions and beliefs to converge
on the optimal policy. In the smaller tasks, learning the probabilistic dependencies
between the smaller number of variables can be done with a relatively small number of
trials, so the ability to conserve previous information is much less important.
The difference in reward compared to the non-relevant agent is smaller than expected.
We suspect this is because actions which exert a strong causal influence over scope+(R )
will be an ancestor to scope+(R ) in the most likely probabilistic structure (Pa∗),
regardless of whether we enforce (4.17). Figure 4.10 illustrates this point with a typical
example DN structure learned by each respective agent. Actions the non-relevant agent
leaves disconnected are those which exert little causal influence over scope+(R ) (and
thus are less likely to have a strong effect on the optimal policy). This means that how
much abandoning connectivity affects performance depends on how noisy the causation
in the domain model is, which we don’t know with certainty in advance.
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Figure 4.7: Cumulative rewards for Large DN (36 variables, T = 3000 trials)
Figures 4.3 to 4.7 also show how the agent’s performance differs when varying the
expert’s tolerance level: with a high tolerance, the agent takes longer to converge
towards a good policy and also tends to learn a (marginally) worse final policy. Figures
4.4 and 4.8 give a clue as to why: Early on, the agent’s policy becomes “good enough”
for the high tolerance expert, meaning the expert does not reveal the last few extra
action variables or beliefs which might help the agent gain small increases in its total
accumulated reward.
We also measured the total run-time of each agent across each task to see if this revealed
any further insights. As Figure 4.9 shows, we found that the non-conservative agent
tended to take longer to compute an updated DN in each time step as compared to
the other agents, despite becoming aware of similar numbers of belief and action
variables. The reason for this is that, by conserving information about the relative
probabilities of parent set structures between discoveries, the default agent is able to
more aggressively prune the set of reasonable parent sets P at each time step. In contrast,
the non-conservative agent resets its structural priors upon each new discovery, meaning
the set of reasonable parent sets tends to remain much larger for a longer period of time.
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Figure 4.8: Size of X and A
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Figure 4.10: Examples of DN structures learned by agents on the medium DN task
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Figure 4.11: Rewards, number of variables, and time taken of agents on the large DN
task, with varying levels of minimality. The shaded areas represent the standard error
from the mean.
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(a) Better Action Advice (Eq 4.12)
























(b) Unknown Effect (Eq 4.28)
Figure 4.12: Average number of messages sent by the experts of varying tolerances on
the Barley DN.
Figure 4.11 shows the results comparing the rewards, variables learned, and time
taken of the default agent compared to the no-pruning and uniform-prior agents. As
expected, the effect of not pruning the set of reasonable parents is that the run-time is
orders of magnitude longer than for the default agent. In fact, the no-pruning agent is
vastly slower despite typically learning a smaller number of belief variables throughout
learning.6 As for the uniform-prior agent, we found only a marginal difference in
run-time compared to the default agent. This is largely because the initial structural
prior P(Pa) tends to only make a difference in the initial time steps when data is sparse.
Further, despite setting the structural prior to be uniform, there is still an implicit
sense of minimality encoded in the structural posterior (equation (3.1)) itself: since we
integrate over all possible parameter settings, structures with fewer parameters tend to
be a better fit to small amounts of data than complex structures with many parameters.
These experiments therefore verify our initial intuition that assuming minimality would
result in faster run-times without harming the quality of the models learned by the agent.
Figures 4.12 and 4.13 show the number of messages sent from the expert to the agent on
the Barley task, and when each message was sent. The trends shown for these figures
apply across the other DNs as well. For the default setup, the expert offers a correction
in less than 2% of trials, and reveals only 1-2 edges of the true task’s structure over the
course of the experiment. Our system therefore succeeds in its goal to avoid incessant
6The reason the no-pruning agent tends to learn a smaller number of belief variables is because, if all
parent-sets are considered reasonable, then the agent never asks questions of the form (4.27), which cuts
off a potential source of new belief variables.
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(a) Better Action Advice (Eq 4.12)



















(b) Unknown Effect (Eq 4.28)
Figure 4.13: Average number of messages sent to Conservative versus Non-
Conservative agents on the Barley DN.
interruptions. Most of these corrections arrive in the early trials, then gradually decline
in frequency as the agent learns a policy which gets closer to the true optimal policy.
Note however, that even when the agent has learned the optimal policy, the expert still
occasionally interrupts. This is because the agent is ε-greedy, and so will occasionally
take several random (non-optimal) actions consecutively. We could remedy this by
having the agent announce its intentions in advance, as done in Torrey and Taylor (2013)
(for example, the agent could announce “I am exploring now!” whenever it is about to
take a random action). However, doing so would restrict the generality of agent and
expert’s interaction strategies.
As expected, the lowTolerance expert interrupts the most, while the highTolerance expert
interrupts the least. What is more interesting is that the nonConservative agent receives
more corrections than the conservative agent, but ends up gathering less cumulative
reward, discovering less vocabulary, and being informed of less edges in the true DN.
This is because the non-conservative agent resets its beliefs whenever it discovers a
new action or variable, and so receives corrections for areas of the state space that it
previously already learned, but “forgot”. The conservative agent receives less advice,
but the advice more frequently applies to previously unexplored areas of the state space.
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4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that through a mixture of domain trials and dialogue evidence,
an agent can learn all components of a decision problem. This includes not only the
structure Pa and parameters θ, but also the reward function R , its domain scope(R ),
and the hypothesis space A ∪X itself. Our experiments show that the agent is able to
converge on optimal behaviour despite starting with an incomplete hypothesis space,
and that the design decisions built on the principles of conserving information as new
discoveries are made and minimizing complexity help keep the problem tractable while
guiding the agent to better solutions faster.
In this chapter, we dealt only with single-stage problems, where all actions are taken
in a single step and the final outcomes and rewards are received immediately. In the
next chapter, we look at sequential decision problems, where the problem might take
place over a large number of interdependent steps, and where rewards and transition
probabilities are dependent on the history of the agent’s actions.

Chapter 5
Unforeseen Possibilities in Sequential
Decision Problems
In the previous chapters, we dealt with “single-stage” decision problems, where the
outcome of an agent’s current action was independent of previous states or actions.
However, many real-world decision problems take place over a sequence of related
steps— actions in the past may affect which outcomes (and hence which rewards),
are reachable in the future. The contribution of this chapter is to extend both our
agent’s learning model and the expert’s communication framework to support sequential
decision problems, and once again show that our agent is guaranteed to converge on an
optimal policy in both theory (via formal proofs) and practice (via experiments).
5.1 The Learning Task
We focus on learning complex, episodic, finite state sequential decision problems by
learning Factored Markov Decision Processes (FMDPs). We begin with the formalisms
for learning optimal behaviour in FMDPs where the agent is fully aware of all possible
states and actions, but doesn’t know anything about dependencies among those factors
(let alone conditional probabilities) nor rewards. We then extend the task to one where
the agent starts unaware of relevant variables and actions, and show how the agent
overcomes this unawareness with expert aid.
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5.1.1 Episodic Markov Decision Processes
An FMDP is a tuple 〈S ,Ss,Se,A,T ,R 〉, where S and A are (as before), the set of states
and actions;1 Ss ⊆ S are possible starting states of an episode and Se ⊆ S are the end
(terminal) states; T : S ×A×S → [0,1] is the markovian transition function P(s′|s,a)
and R : S →R is the immediate reward function.2 A policy π : S ×A→ [0,1] defining
the probability π(s,a) that the agent will take action a in state s.
When referring to the local time m in episode n, we denote the current state and reward
by sm,n and rm,n = R (sm,n). When referring to the global time t across episodes, we






i ∗ ri,n (5.1)
where 0≤ γ≤ 1 is the discount factor governing how strongly the agent prefers imme-
diate rewards to those further in the future.
The agent’s goal is to learn the true optimal policy π+, which maximizes not just the
agent’s immediate reward, but the expected discounted return across all states. The
value function Vπ(s) defines the expected return when following a given policy π, while
the related action-value function Qπ(s,a) gives the expected return of taking action a in
state s, and thereafter following π:
Vπ(s) = R (s)+ γ ∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,π(s))Vπ(s′) (5.2)
Qπ(s,a) = R (s)+ γ ∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,a)Vπ(s′) (5.3)
When T and R are known, π+ can be calculated via value iteration (Sutton and Barto,
1998). Further, as we did for DNs, we can measure the expected loss in discounted
return of following a policy π versus π+ using (5.4), which we refer to as the policy
error. If the agent’s policy is unknown, we can approximate the policy error using (5.5):
1In contrast to previous chapters, we do not factor actions as assignments to a set of variables.
2Other works allow R to depend on the action and/or resulting state (i.e., R : S ×A×S →R), but
we ignore this detail here.




















If all episodes eventually terminate, then (5.5) will converge to (5.4). If we assume as
before that our agent is using an ε-greedy policy (ε > 0), then termination in almost all
episodic FMDPs is guaranteed:
Definition 1 (Proper Policy). A policy π is proper if, from all states s ∈ S , acting
according to π guarantees one eventually reaches some terminal state s′ ∈ Se.
Theorem 3. If a proper policy π exists for a given episodic MDP, then any policy which
is ε-greedy with respect to A is also proper
5.2 Learning FMDPs when fully aware
If T and/or R are unknown, then the agent must estimate their values using the data
D0:t = [d0, . . . ,dt ] gathered from its interaction with the environment. At time t, the
sequential trial dt = 〈st ,at ,st+1,rt+1〉 represents the current state st , the action at , the
resulting state st+1 and the reward rt+1 given on entering st+1. As with DNs, FMDPs
allow one to learn the transition structure of large MDPs by representing states as a joint
assignment to a set of variables X = {X1, . . . ,Xn}. That is, s ∈ v(X ). Similarly, the
reward function is defined as a function R : v(scope(R ))→R, where scope(R )⊆ X
are variables which uniquely determine the reward received in each state. To exploit
conditional independence, T is then represented as a separate dynamic bayesian network
(DBN) (Dean and Kanazawa, 1989) for each action. That is, T = {dbna1, . . . ,dbnan},
where dbna = 〈Paa,θa〉. Here, Paa is a DAG with nodes {X1, . . . ,Xn,X ′1, . . . ,X ′n} where,
as is standard, node Xi denotes the value of variable Xi ∈ X at the current time step,




defines the parents of X ′i . These are the set of variables on which the value of
X ′i depends. It is assumed that X
′
i is independent of all other variables. We also make
the common assumption that our DBNs contain no synchronic arcs Degris and Sigaud
(2010):




Figure 5.1: Example 3-variable DBN. An arc from Xi to X ′j means that Xi’s value in the
previous time step influences X j ’s value in the current one
∀i,∀a,PaaX ′i ⊆ {X1, . . . ,Xn} (5.6)
This structure, along with the associated parameters θa, allow us to write transition





s′[X ],s[PaaX ′ ]
(5.7)
Where θaX ′=i,PaaX ′= j
denotes the probability of variable X taking on value i given that
the agent performed action a when the variables PaaX ′ had assignment j in the current
time step.3 Figure 5.1 show an example of a simple 3-variable DBN for a given action a.
Notice, for example, that X2’s value in the current time step is dependent only on the
values of X1 and X2 in the previous time-step.
Exploiting independence among belief variables does not necessarily result in a compact
representation of Vπ, since even those variables which are not part of scope(R ) tend
to become entangled and exert some influence on expected returns as the sequential
problem progresses. We must therefore also exploit the context-specific independencies
between assignments by representing both T and R as decision trees, rather than just
as tables of values.
Figures 5.2a and 5.2b show an example decision tree for a reward function and condi-
tional probability distribution. The leaves are either immediate rewards, or a distribution
over the values of a variable. The non-leaves are test nodes, which perform a binary test
of the form (X = i?) to check whether the variable X takes on the value i in the current
state. Notice in 5.2a that when X = 1 is true, the distribution over X ′ is conditionally
independent of Y .
3When the context is clear, we condense this notation to θai, j.
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X = 1
X': <0.9, 0.1> Y = 0
X': <0.5, 0.5> X': <0.6, 0.4>
(a) CPT for P(X ′|PaaX ′), where PaaX ′ = {Y,Z}
X = 1
7 Y = 1
9 10
(b) Reward tree where scope(R ) = {X ,Y}
Figure 5.2: Examples of Decision Trees
Given trials D0:t we can estimate the most likely DBN structure, decision tree structures,
and parameters, then subsequently use these estimates to estimate Vπ+ via a series of
steps.
5.2.1 Estimating DBN structure




BDt(X ′,PaaX ′) (5.8)
















Here, NaX ′=i,PaaX ′= j
denotes the number of trials in D0:t where the agent took action a
in a state where variables PaaX ′ had the joint assignment j, resulting in a state where X
takes on the value i.
In most sequential decision problems, one usually assumes that each of the agent’s
actions affect only a small number of features in the environment. Further, while some
variables are inherently stochastic, it seems sensible to assume that variables which are
not acted upon by the agent are likely to maintain their current value from one time step
to another (Boutilier and Goldszmidt, 1996). We can encode this assumption into the
agent’s prior beliefs about Pa using equation (5.11):
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(1− f (Z,X)) (5.11)
f (Y,X) =
ρsame if Y = X
ρdiff otherwise
(5.12)
Where the parameter 0.5 < ρsame < 1 governs how strongly the agent favours making
X a parent of X ′, and parameter 0 < ρdiff ≤ 0.5 determines how averse the agent is to
allowing other variables to affect X ′. As in equation (3.4), equation (5.11) states that the
probability of parent set PaaX ′ is then the product of each individual parent’s presence or
absence.
As before, if the space of possible DBNs is too large, we can restrict the parent sets
considered reasonable by restricting the maximum in-degree, or using heuristics such
as sparse candidate (Friedman et al., 1999), or the using the structure lattice of Buntine
(1991). However, notice that because of our assumption that the FMDP does not contain
any synchronous arcs, we do not have to worry about whether our final learned structure
will be a DAG, and can therefore simplify the task of finding Paa∗ by finding each PaaX ′∗
independently.
5.2.2 Estimating conditional probability trees
Given each PaaX ′ , we can then compute each variable’s most likely conditional probabil-
ity tree structure DTa∗X using equations (5.13-5.14):
P(DTaX |PaaX ′,D0:t) ∝ P(DT
a
X)P(D0:t |DTaX) (5.13)













Here, each leaf node ` ∈ Leaves(DTaX) is described by its branch label within the
decision tree (i.e., the set of assignments on the path starting from the root of the tree
and ending at `). For example, in Figure 5.2a, the leaf with value X ′ : 〈0.5,0.5〉 has
branch label {X = 0,Y = 0}. Since we have assumed our DBN structure is PaaX ′ , we
only consider tree structures where all test nodes are members of PaaX ′ .
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X = 1
Y = 0 Y = 0
L_a L_b L_c L_d
(a) Before transposition
Y = 0
X = 1 X = 1
L_a L_c L_b L_d
(b) After transposition
Figure 5.3: Example of transposing root node X = 1 with Y = 0
Rather than evaluating the probabilities of all possible DT structures each step, we can
cache the relevant Ni|` counts at each node, and incrementally update the most likely
DT as new trials arrive using incremental tree induction (ITI), as show in Algorithm 4.
ITI is described in detail in Utgoff et al. (1997), but broadly works as follows:
When a new trial dt arrives, it starts at the tree’s root and passes through the test nodes
corresponding to dt’s particular assignments. At each node dt touches, UPDATE-INFO
updates the scores (5.13) for each potential test at that node, then marks that node
as being out of date (“stale”), before finally recording dt at the appropriate leaf node.
Updating the test probabilities at each test node may mean that the current test at a
particular node is no longer the most likely one. If so, we replace old test with the new
most probable one, and recursively restructure (via TRANSPOSE-TREE) the decision
tree such that the nodes below this one have valid leaves and data.
Figure 5.3 shows an example DT with leaves La,Lb,Lc, and Ld being transposed in
response to a new domain trial making Y = 0 a more likely test candidate for the root
node than X = 1. Notice that, for many transposition operations, we can exploit shared
nodes further down to avoid recounting domain trials. Full details of the operation of
updates and transpositions in ITI can be found in Utgoff et al. (1997)
5.2.2.1 Handling changing values of PaaX ′
The above explanation assumed PaaX ′ remained the same between ITI updates. However,




X ′ more likely via equation
(5.8), then our current DTaX may be invalid. If this occurs, there are three scenarios to
consider:
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if node is a leaf then
node.examples← node.examples∪ example
if node should be converted to decision node then
CONVERT-TO-DECISION-NODE(node)
node.stale← f alse
for all e in node.examples do












if node is decision node ∧ node.stale then
bestTest← FIND-BEST-TEST(node)
if bestTest 6= node.currentTest then
TRANSPOSE-TREE(node, bestTest)
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First, if Paa,t+1X ′ ⊂ Pa
a,t
X ′ , then all the sufficient statistics we need to update DT
a
X ′ are
already present in DTa,tX ′ . As an example, suppose at time t we had Pa
a,t
X ′ = {X ,Y,Z},
but in at time t + 1 we have Paa,t+1X ′ = {X ,Y}. In the trivial scenario where Z is not
currently being used at any test node in DTaX ′ , we do not need to make any changes
to the structure of DTaX ′—we simply remove Z as a candidate test for each node and
we are done. If Z is being used at some test node, then we must replace it with the
next most likely test out of X and Y , triggering a tree re-structuring as outlined in the
previous section. Since we already have the relevant counts and probabilities for these
tests stored at the relevant node, the information we need to conduct this restructuring
is immediately available.
Second, if Paa,tX ′ ⊂ Pa
a,t+1
X ′ , this may require more computation. Suppose this time we
have Paa,tX ′ = {X} and Pa
a,t+1
X ′ = {X ,Y}. Since we do not have the counts for tests on Y
immediately available at the previous test nodes, we must compute them. Fortunately,
we can do this without a full pass over D0:t , as we already have the counts we need from
the calculation of Paa,t+1’s likelihood. For example, if we wish to compute (5.14) for a
decision node with attribute test “Y = 0?”, then we can compute the required sufficient
statistics (e.g. NX ′=0|Y=0) from a combination of the statistics used to compute (5.8) and
(5.14) (e.g. NX ′=0|X=0,Y=0 +NX ′=0|X=1,Y=0).
Third, if neither Paa,t+1X ′ ⊂ Pa
a,t
X ′ nor Pa
a,t
X ′ ⊂ Pa
a,t+1
X ′ is true, we can concatenate the
solutions to the first two scenarios—first we remove all the missing variables, then add
in all additional variables.
5.2.3 Estimating the reward tree
We can use ITI to learn a tree structure for R in the same way, with only a few minor
differences. First, we restrict our node test to members of scope(R ), rather than PaaX ′ .
Second, rather than recording a list of trials at each leaf node, each leaf node ` stores
a set of relevant state/reward pairs SRP` (since we are not interested in storing the
frequencies of duplicate trials):
SRP` = {〈s,r〉|λ(s) = `,〈s′,a,s,r〉 ∈ D0:t} (5.15)
Here, λ(s) is a function which takes a state assignment and returns the leaf to which s
would be assigned in our current DT.
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The third difference is how the agent decides which test to install at each node. We are
no longer learning a probabilistic parameter, so equation (5.13) is unsuitable. Instead,
we wish to choose the tests which will minimize the expected entropy of the reward
received in a given state. Equation (5.16) gives the expected entropy for splitting a leaf


















Where Nsp is the number of trials at the current node which pass test sp, N¬sp is the
number which fail it, and Rsp is the set of unique rewards present in states which
pass the test sp (formally, Rsp = {r|〈s,r〉 ∈ srp` ∧ sp(s) == true}). H(R|sp) is the
conditional entropy of possible reward values R given sp, and Nr|sp is the number of
state descriptions which pass the test sp and whose reward is r.
5.2.4 Estimating Vπ+
Once our agent has an estimate of T and R , we can then use structured value iteration
(SVI) (Boutilier et al., 2000)—a variant of value iteration which works with decision
trees instead of tables—to compute a compact representation of Vπ+ . Algorithm 5 shows
an outline of an incremental version of SVI (iSVI) (Degris et al., 2006), which allows
the agent to gradually update its beliefs about the optimal value function in response to
incoming trials. The algorithm takes the current estimate of the reward and transition
functions (Rt and Tt), along with the previous estimate of the optimal value function
(Vt−1), and combines them to produce a new estimate for each state-action function
(Qat ), and value function (Vt).
Algorithm 5 Incremental SVI (Degris et al., 2006)
1: function INCSVI(Rt , Tt , Vt−1)
2: ∀a ∈ A : Qat ← REGRESS(Vt−1,dbna,Rt)
3: Vt←MERGE({Qat : ∀a∈ A}) (using maximization as the combination function)
4: return {Vt ,{∀a ∈ A : Qat }}
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X = 1








7 Y = 1
10 10
Vt
Figure 5.4: Example of merging Qa1t and Q
a2
t to form Vt
The first operator REGRESS(Tree(Vt−1),a), takes the value-tree from the previous
iteration, and produces a tree-structured Q-function Qat for each possible action a:







The second operator MERGE({Qa1t ,Q
a2
t , . . . Q
an
t ,}) combines each of the Q-functions
at the tth iteration into a single value tree via maximisation. This then represents the
value function Vt over all possible states. Figure 5.4 shows an example of Q-trees Q
a1
t
and Qa2t being merged to produce the latest value function Vt . As with the original value
iteration algorithm, SVI is guaranteed to converge to the true optimal policy, but unlike
regular value iteration, it (in general) produces a more compact description of the final
policy function in substantially less computation time. For full details how the MERGE
and REGRESS function in SVI operate, see Boutilier et al. (2000).
This section took an encapsulated approach to learning T (In contrast to a unified one
in e.g., Degris et al. (2006)). This means we separate the task of finding an optimal
DBN structure from the task of learning each local DT structure. Such an approach
significantly reduces the space of DTs that must be considered, but more importantly,
provides us with posterior distributions P(PaaX ′ |D0:t) over parent structures. We will
use these posterior distributions in Section 5.3.2 to conserve information when adapting
to new discoveries.
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5.3 Overcoming Unawareness
So far, we’ve assumed our agent was aware of all relevant belief variables in X , all
actions A, and all members of scope(R ). As in previous chapters, we now drop this
assumption. From here onward we denote the true set of belief variables, actions, and
reward scope as X+, A+ and scope+(R ), and the learner’s awareness of them at t as
X t , At , and scopet(R ).
The next sections aims to answer two main questions. First, how does the protocol for
communication between the agent and expert differ in the case of sequential problems
when compared with the interaction we modelled in Chapter 4 for single-shot decision
problems? Second, when an agent discovers a new belief variable or action, how can
they integrate it into their current FMDP model while conserving what they have learned
from past experience?
5.3.1 Expert Guidance
As in the previous chapter, our agent can expand its awareness via advice from an expert,
who is once again cooperative, infallible, and has full knowledge of the true FMDP. The
three types of advice we identify in this section—advice on a better action, resolving a
misunderstanding, and explaining an unexpected reward—are broadly similar to the
ones defined in Chapter 3, and their combination guarantees our agent behaves optimally
in the long run regardless of initial unawareness. However, the conditions under which
the expert utters these types of advice, and the inferences the agent can draw from them
differ slightly due to the sequential nature of the task.
5.3.1.1 Better Action Advice
If the expert sees the agent perform a sub-optimal action, it can tell the agent a better
action it could have taken instead. For example: “When it is raining, take your umbrella
instead of your sun hat”. Again, our goal is to avoid incessantly interrupting the agent
each time it makes a mistake, so we specify the following conditions for when the agent
is performing sufficiently poorly to warrant correction: Let t be the current (global)
time step corresponding to the mth step in the nth episode. Similarly, let t ′, m′, n′ be the
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time the expert last uttered advice. When (5.19-5.21) hold, the expert will utter advice
of the form (5.22):
t− t ′ > µmin (5.19)
Err(n′,n)> β∨m > µmax (5.20)







Equation (5.19) ensures some minimum time µmin has passed since the expert last gave
advice (compare this with equation (4.7)). Equation (5.20) ensures the expert won’t
interrupt unless its estimate of the agent’s policy error is above some threshold β (cf
equation (4.8)), or if the agent is unable to reach a terminal state after some reasonable
bound µmax (which is required because the agent’s unawareness of A+ may mean its
current ε-greedy policy is not proper). If episode n is unfinished, the expert estimates the
expected return via the heuristic Gn ≈ ∑m−1i=0 γiri,n + γmVπ+(sm,n), i.e., we optimistically
assume the agent will follow π+ from now on. Taken together, µmin,µmax and β describe
the expert’s tolerance towards the agent’s mistakes. Finally, (5.21) ensures a better
action a′ actually exists this step.
Equation (5.22) is the expert’s utterance. In a similar fashion to the previous chapter,
wsm,n is a sense ambiguous term, whose intended meaning is the true state sm,n but whose
default interpretation by the agent at time t is sm,n[X t ]. The agent can thus interpret this
advice in two ways: The first is as a partial description of the true problem, which is
monotonically true regardless of what it learns in future. On hearing (5.22), the agent
adds (5.23-5.24) to its list of partial descriptions of the true FMDP:
a′ ∈ A+ (5.23)
∃s,s[X t ] = sm,n[X t ]∧Qπ+(s,a′)> Qπ+(s,am,n) (5.24)
Notice that this differs from the partial description (4.15) from the previous chapter, in
that be can the agent can no longer infer that the expert’s advice entails the existence of
a state with a higher immediate reward. This is because, in a sequential problem, an
action may be better in the current state not because it leads to a better expected reward
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immediately, but because it increases the probability of entering a higher reward state
some time in the future.
Additionally, the agent can choose to add its current default interpretation of the advice
to its accumulated knowledge:
∀s,s[X t ] = st [X t ] =⇒ Qπ+(s[X t ],a′)> Qπ+(s[X t ],a) (5.25)
The agent can then act on the expert’s advice directly by choosing a′ whenever s[X t ] =
sm,n[X t ], regardless of what seems likely from D0:t .
Lemma 4 guarantees the expert’s dialogue strategy for offering unsolicited advice
eventually reveals unforeseen actions to the agent so long as its performance in trials
exceeds the expert’s tolerance.
Lemma 4. Consider an FMDP where π+ is proper, an agent with awareness X t ⊆
X +,At ⊂ A+, and expert acting with respect to (5.19-5.22). If ∃a ∈ image(π+),a /∈ At
then as k→ ∞, either Err(t, t + k)→ c with c≤ β or the expert utters (5.21) such that
a′ /∈ At .
Outline Proof. If Err(t, t + k)→ c ≤ β, we are done. If not, we must consider two
cases—one where an ε-greedy policy over At is proper, and one where it is not. If it
is, (5.20) will eventually be satisfied, since the expert will gather enough samples to
approximate the agent’s policy error (which is above β). Further, we know ∃s,π+(s) =
a′∧a′ /∈ At , and that s is reachable by the agent, so (5.21) will eventually be satisfied.
If the agent’s policy is not proper, the agent may visit some set of states S ′ ⊂ S \Se
infinitely often (thus satisfying (5.20) for finite µmax). Since π+ is proper, there must
exist some s ∈ S ′ such that ∃a′ /∈ At ,∀a ∈ At ,Qπ+(s,a′) > Qπ+(s,a), thus satisfying
(5.21). In either case, (5.19) will eventually be satisfied for finite µmin. Since (5.19-5.21)
are not mutually exclusive, all three will eventually be true simultaneously, causing the
expert to utter (5.22).
5.3.1.2 Resolving Misunderstandings
We noted before that, just like in the interaction for learning a DN in Chapter 4, the
agent’s defeasible interpretation of expert advice could result in misunderstandings
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about the intended meaning. To illustrate, suppose the agent receives advice (5.26) and













While the intended meaning of each statement is true, the agent’s default interpretations
of wst−k and w
s
t may be identical. That is, st−k[X t ] = st [X t ]. From the agent’s perspective,
(5.26) and (5.27) conflict, and thus give the agent a clue that its current awareness of
X+ is deficient. To resolve this conflict, the agent asks (5.28) (in words, “which X has
distinct values in st−k and st?”) and receives an answer of the form (5.29):
?λX(X ∈ X +∧ st−k[X ] 6= st [X ]) (5.28)
X ∈ X+ (5.29)
Notice there may be multiple variables in X + \X t whose assignments differ in st−k and
st . Thus, the expert’s answer can be non-exhaustive, providing the minimum amount of
information to resolve the agent’s conflict without necessarily explaining all components
of the task. This means the agent must abandon its previous defeasible interpretation of
(5.25), but can keep (5.23-5.24), as these are true regardless of known variables. Lemma
5 guarantees the expert will (eventually) reveal new belief variables, provided that the
agent’s unawareness is such that misunderstandings are still possible.
Lemma 5. Consider an FMDP where π+ is proper and an agent with awareness X t ⊂
X+, image(π+) ⊆ At ⊆ A+. If ∃s∃s′ 6= s,s[X t ] = s′[X t ], and π+(s) 6= π+(s′), then as
k→ ∞, either Err(t, t + k)→ c (c≤ β), or the expert utters (5.29) such that X /∈ X t
Outline Proof. The ε-greedy agent is aware of all actions in image(π+), so can visit
all states reachable via π+, including s and s′. If Err(t, t + k)→ c,c≤ β, we are done.




,a′). Similarly, at some time t +k2, the agent will receive advice
Q(wst+k2,a
′)> Q(wst+k2,a). Since st+k1[X
t ] = st+k2[X t ], the two pieces of advice appear
to the agent to conflict, so the agent will ask (5.28) with answer X /∈ X t .
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5.3.1.3 Unexpected Rewards
In typical FMDPs (where the agent is assumed fully aware of X +,A+, and scope+(R )),
we tend only to think of the trials as providing counts, but for an unaware agent, a trial
dt = 〈st ,at ,st+1,rt+1〉 also encodes monotonic information:
∃s,s[X t ] = st+1∧R+(s) = rt+1 (5.30)
This constrains the form of R the agent must learn. Recall that scopet(R ), may be only
a subset scope+(R ), so it might be impossible to construct an R : v(scopet(R ))→R
satisfying all descriptions (5.30) gathered so far. Further, those extra variables in
scope+(R )\ scopet(R ) may not be in X t . To resolve this, if the agent fails to construct
a valid reward function, it asks (5.31) (in words, “which variable X (that I don’t already
know) is in scope(R )?”), receiving an answer (5.32):
?λX(X ∈ scope+(R )
∧
X ′∈scopet(R )
X 6= X ′) (5.31)
X ∈ scope+(R )∧X ∈ X + (5.32)
Again, the agent may be unaware of many variables in scope+(R ), so (5.32) may be
non exhaustive. Even so, we can guarantee that the agent’s learned reward function
eventually equals R+:
Lemma 6. Consider an FMDP where π+ is proper and an agent with awareness At ⊆A+,
X t ⊆ X +, scopet(R )⊆ scope+(R ). As k→∞, there exists a K such that for all k≥ K,
Rt+k(s) = R+(s) for all states s reachable using At .
Outline Proof. If s is reachable using At , then as k→ ∞, an ε-greedy agent will eventu-
ally enter s at some time i, receive reward R+(s), and update its current reward function
so that Ri(s) = R+(s). If the agent has previously encountered another s′ such that
s[scopet(R )] = s′[scopet(R )] and R+(s) 6= R+(s′), the partial descriptions (5.30) for
s and s′ will conflict. The agent resolves this by asking (5.31), receiving an answer
differentiating s from s′ in R+.
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5.3.2 Adapting the Transition Function
Section 5.3.1 showed three ways the agent could expand its awareness of X , A, and
scope(R ). If we wish to improve on the naive approach of restarting learning when
faced with such expansions, we must now specify how the agent adapts T and R to
such discoveries.
Adapting T upon discovering a new action a′ at time t is simple: Since the agent
hasn’t performed a′ in any previous trial, it can just create a new DBN, dbna′ , using
the priors outlined in Section 5.2.1. Our new model at time t then becomes T =
{dbnta1, . . .dbn
t
an}∪{dbna′}.
The more difficult issue is adapting T upon discovering a new belief variable Z. The
main problem is that the agent’s current distributions over DBNs no longer cover all
possible parent sets for each variable, nor all DTs. For example, the current distribution
over PaaX ′ does not include the possibility that Z is a parent of X
′. Worse, since we
assume in general that the agent cannot observe Z’s past values in D0:t , it cannot observe
the true value of NaZ=i| j, nor N
a
X=i|PaaX ′= j
when Z ∈ PaaX ′ . The α-parameters involving Z
are also undefined, yet we need them to calculate structure probabilities (5.9, 5.13) and
parameters via (3.6).
As done for DNs in the last chapter, our method discards the data gathered during the
learner’s previous deficient view of the hypothesis space, but conserves the relative
posterior probabilities learned from past data to construct new priors for the Paa, DTa
and θa in the expanded belief space.
5.3.2.1 Parent Set Priors
On discovering Z, the agent must update P(PaaX ′) for each X 6= Z and a ∈ A
t to include
parent sets containing Z. In (5.33) we construct a new prior P′(PaaX ′) using the old
posterior (where C is a normalizing constant):
P′(PaaX ′) =
(1−ρ)P(PaaX ′|D0:t) if Z /∈ PaaX ′
ρP((PaaX ′ \Z)|D0:t) otherwise
(5.33)
This preserves the likelihoods among the parent sets that do not include Z. It also
maintains our bias towards simpler structures by re-assigning only a portion ρ of the
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probability mass to parent sets including Z. To define P(PaaZ′)—the distribution over
parent sets for the newly discovered variable Z—we default to (5.11), since the agent
has no evidence (yet) concerning Z’s parents.
5.3.2.2 Decision Tree and Parameter Priors
We must also update P(DTaX |PaaX ′), and P(θ
a
X ,PaaX ′
|PaaX ′) to accommodate Z. Here, we
return to the issue of the counts Nai| j and the associated α-parameters. As mentioned
earlier, we wish to avoid the complexity of estimating Z’s past values. Instead, we
throw away the past counts of Nai| j, but retain the relative likelihoods they gave rise to
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X ′) ∝ ∏
`∈leaves(DTaX ′)
β(αaX ′=1|`, . . . ,α
a
X ′=n|`) (5.35)
Equation (5.34) summarizes D0:t via inferences on the old best DBNs, then encodes
these inferences in the new α-parameters. The revised α-parameters ensure the new
tree structure prior and expected parameters defined via (5.35) and (3.6) bias towards
models the agent previously thought were likely. Indeed, the larger the (user-specified)
K parameter is, the more the distributions learned before discovering Z influence the
agent’s reasoning after discovering Z.
5.3.3 Adapting the Reward and Value Functions
On becoming aware that a new Z is part of scope+(R ), the agent may wish to restructure
its reward tree. This is because awareness that Z ∈ scope+(R ) means there are tests of
the form Z = i that the agent has not yet tried which may produce a more compact tree.
In the language of ITI, the current test nodes are “stale”, and must be re-checked to see
if a replacement test would yield a tree with better information gain.
The only added complication here is that, since the agent may have previously unaware
of Z (i.e., Z /∈ X t), we know that the previous set of state-reward descriptions at each
node given by equation (5.15) were actually only partial state-reward descriptions:
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SRP` = {〈s[X t ],r〉|λ(s[X t ]) = `,〈s′[X t ],a,s[X t ],r〉 ∈ D0:t} (5.36)
We can still test on the values of partial state-reward descriptions by following the ITI
convention that any partial description where Z is missing automatically fails any test
on the value of Z. Further, if some future trial d j has a strictly more precise partial
description than some previous trial di (i < j), then can completely replace the partial
state-reward description of di by d j.
Once we have updated T and R , there is no need to make further changes to Vt in
response to a new action a′ or variable Z. In effect, this encodes our conservative
intuition that the true Vπ+ is more likely to be closer to the agent’s current estimate
Vt than some arbitrary value function. The agent essentially assumes (in absence of
further information) that the value of a state is indifferent to this newly discovered factor.
In subsequent trials where the agent performs a′ or observes Z, algorithm 5 ensures
information about this new factor is incorporated into the agent’s value function.
Algorithm 6 outlines how the agent updates T , R , and V in response to new data and
expert advice. Given algorithm 6, Theorem 4 guarantees our agent behaves indistin-
guishably from a near-optimal policy in the long run (where by “near-optimal” we mean
that it is within the bounds β of the expert’s tolerance to the agent’s mistakes), regardless
of initial awareness (provided all X ∈ X + are relevant to expressing the optimal policy).
Theorem 4. Consider an FMDP where π+ is proper and an agent with initial awareness
X 0 ⊆ X +,A0 ⊆ A+, and scope0(R ) ⊆ scope+(R ) acts according to algorithm 6. If
for all X ∈ X +, there exists a pair of states s,s′ such that s[X+ \ X ] = s′[X+ \ X ],
s[X ] 6= s′[X ], and π+(s) 6= π+(s′), then as t→ ∞, Err(0, t)→ c such that c≤ β
Outline Proof. By repeatedly applying Theorems 4 - 6, we have that if Err(0, t) has not
yet converged to c≤ β, then there exists a K where image(π+)⊆ AK , X K = X +, and
RK(s) = R+(s) for all s reachable with AK . Thus X K , AK , RK define a separate MDP
for which the agent is fully aware, but has the same π+ as the original. All episodes
terminate, so the agent’s estimate of T eventually approximates the true transition
function, Vt converges to the Vπ+ , and thus Err(0, t)→ 0.
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Algorithm 6 Learning FMDPs with Unawareness
1: function LEARNFMDPU(A0, X 0, T0, Q0, V0, s0)
2: for t = 1 . . .maxTrials do
3: 〈st ,rt〉 ← ε-GREEDY(st−1, Qt−1, adv0:t−1)
4: 〈Tt ,Rt〉 ← Add 〈st ,rt〉 via (5.9-3.6) & ITI
5: if Update to Rt fails then
6: Z← Ask expert (5.28)
7: 〈scopet(R ),X t〉 ← Append Z to each
8: Rt ← Update via ITI
9: if (5.19-5.21) are true then
10: advt ← Expert advice of form (5.22)
11: if advt mentions action a′ /∈ At−1 then
12: A t ← A t−1∪{a′}
13: Tt ← Tt−1∪{dbna′} made via (5.11)
14: if adv0:t−1 conflicts with advt then
15: Z← Ask expert (5.28)
16: X t ← X t−1∪{Z}
17: if X t−1 6= X t then
18: Tt ← Update via (5.34, 5.9, 5.35, 5.13, 3.6)
19: 〈Vt ,Qt〉 ← INCSVI(Rt ,Tt ,Vt−1)
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5.4 Experiments
Our experiments show that agents following algorithm 6 converge to near-optimal
behaviour in both theory and practice. Further, we show that conserving information
on T and V gathered before each new discovery allows our agent learn faster than one
which abandons this information. We do not investigate assigning an explicit budget to
agent-expert communication, leaving this to future work. However we do show how
varying the expert’s tolerance affects the agent’s performance.
We test agents on two well-known problems: Coffee-Robot and Factory.4 In each, our
agent begins with only partial awareness of X+, A+ and scope+(R ). The agent takes
actions for T time steps, using an ε-greedy policy (ε = 0.1). When the agent enters a
terminal state, we reset it to one of the initial states randomly. We use the cumulative
reward across all trials as our evaluation metric, which acts as a proxy for the quality of
the agent’s policy over time. To make the results more readable, we apply a discount of
0.99 at each step, resulting in the metric Rdisct = rt +0.99∗Rdisct−1 .
We test several variants of our agent to show the effectiveness of our approach. The
default agent follows algorithm 6 as is, with parameters ρ = 0.1, K = 5.0, µmin = 10,
β = 0.1, µmax = 50 in equations (5.11), (5.33), (5.34), and (5.19-5.21) respectively. The
nonConservative agent does not conserve information about V , nor T via (5.33-5.35)
when a new factor is discovered. Instead, it resets V and T to their initial values. This
agent is included to show the value of conserving past information as X and A expand.
The truePolicy and random agents start with full knowledge of the true FMDP, and
execute an ε-greedy version of π+, or a choose random action respectively. These agents
provide an upper/lower bound on performance. The lowTolerance / highTolerance
agents change the expert’s tolerance to β = 0.01 and β = 0.5.
5.4.1 Coffee Robot
Coffee-Robot is a small sequential problem where a robot must purchase coffee from a
cafe, then return it to their owner. Also, the robot gets wet if it has no umbrella when
it rains. The problem has 6 boolean variables—HUC (user has coffee), HRC (robot
has coffee), R (raining), W (wet), L (location), U (umbrella)— and 4 actions—MOVE,
DELC, BUYC and GETU— making 256 state/action pairs. The terminal states are those
4Full specifications at https://cs.uwaterloo.ca/˜jhoey/research/spudd/index.php
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Figure 5.5: Cumulative Rewards on Coffee Robot task, T = 1000, averaged over 50
experiments. Shaded areas represent the standard error from the mean.







































Figure 5.6: Cumulative Rewards on Factory task, T = 10000, averaged over 20 experi-
ments. Shaded areas represent the standard error from the mean.
where HUC = 1; initial states are all non-terminal ones. Our agent has initial awareness
A0 = {MOVE}, X 0 = scope0(R ) = {HUC} and discount factor γ = 0.8.5
Figure 5.5 shows each agent’s (discounted) cumulative reward. Despite starting unaware
of factors critical to success, the default agent quickly discovers the relevant actions
and beliefs with the expert’s aid, and converges on the optimal policy. The non-
conservative agent also learns the optimal policy, but takes longer. This shows the value
of conserving T and V on discovering new beliefs. We also see how expert tolerance
affects performance. The agent paired with high tolerance expert learns a (marginally)
worse final policy, but this makes little difference to cumulative reward. Figure 5.7
shows why: The agent learned a “good enough” policy, so the expert doesn’t reveal the
“get umbrella” (GETU) action, which yields only a minor increase in reward. Figure 5.8













move delc move buyc
(b) High Tolerance
Figure 5.7: Typical final policy depending on tolerance
























Figure 5.8: Awareness of |X +| and |A+| on Coffee Robot
supports this explanation, showing how more tolerant experts reveals less variables over
time.
5.4.2 Factory
Factory is a larger problem (|A+| = 14, X+ = 14, 774144 state/action pairs), which
shows our method works on more realistically sized tasks. Here, an agent must shape,
paint and connect two widgets to create products of varying quality. Some actions (like
bolting) produce high quality products, whereas others (like gluing) produce low quality
products. The agent receives a higher reward for producing goods which match the de-
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(a) Better Action (Eq 5.22)





















(b) Resolve a Misunderstanding (Eq 5.29)




















(c) Explaining an unexpected reward (Eq 5.32)
Figure 5.9: Comparing the average number of messages sent by the expert on Factory
when paired with a Conservative versus Non-Conservative agent.
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(a) Better Action (Eq 5.22)






















(b) Resolve a Misunderstanding (Eq 5.29)





















(c) Explaining an unexpected reward (Eq 5.32)
Figure 5.10: Comparing the average number of messages sent by the experts of varying
tolerance on Factory.
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manded quality.6. The terminal states are those where CONNECTED = 1; initial states are
non-terminals where it is possible to connect two components. Our agent’s initial aware-
ness is X 0 = scope0(R ) = {CONNECTED}, A0 = {BOLT, GLUE, DRILLA, DRILLB},
with γ = 0.9. This represents a simplified task where the agent thinks the only goal is
connecting the widgets.
Figure 5.6 shows results similar to previous experiments. The default agent converges
on optimal behaviour, and does so quicker than the non-conservative agent. Varying the
expert’s tolerance now has a larger effect on the rate at which factors are discovered
and on convergence towards the optimal policy (presumably because there are many
more unforeseen variables/actions the agent can discover in this larger problem).
Figures 5.9 and 5.10 break down the messages sent between the agent and expert over
time. These results mirror the findings from section 4.4: The expert provides advice
in only a tiny fraction of trials, agents receive less corrections as the task progresses,
tolerant experts interrupt less frequently, and the non-conservative agent performs more
poorly despite receiving more corrective advice in total.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter extended our agent-expert framework to sequential decision problems, and
showed that our agent could learn optimal behaviour on both small and large FMDPs,
even when starting unaware of factors critical to success. Echoing the results from
previous chapters, we have shown that conserving one’s beliefs about the transition and
value functions improves the effectiveness of learning.
6Rewards were scaled to range 0.0-1.0 and, to make π+ proper, terminal states which previously gave
0 reward were given a small reward of 0.01.
Chapter 6
Conclusion / Future Work
In this thesis, we have proposed a model-based learning framework for dealing with
both single-stage and multi-step sequential decision tasks. However, unlike traditional
approaches, our learning agent begins unaware of the true actions and belief variables
which are relevant to the problem. Our model exploits two kinds of evidence to discover
and learn to exploit factors that the agent starts out unaware of: as is traditional, the
agent uses evidence from trial and error; and in addition, the learner uses evidence from
an extended conversation that it has with a domain expert, where the expert’s utterances
are contextually relevant to the agent’s latest move: either a dialogue move where the
agent has asked a pertinent question to resolve its current dilemma in inference, which
the expert then answers, or unsolicited advice about better options in a context where
the agent has been performing sufficiently poorly on the domain level task. We have
confined the conversation to these types of moves because our eventual aim is for our
model to support learning optimal behaviours from human teachers in a scenario that is
similar to one where an apprentice interacts with a human teacher.
We showed that our formal protocol for communication between the learner and expert,
while confined to the types of dialogue moves that are natural in a human setting
(although the language is not natural, the type of dialogue acts are!), we were able to
provably guarantee that the agent would eventually converge on optimal behaviour,
despite starting unaware of factors that may be critical to success.
By conducting a range of experiments across various bayesian networks, decision
networks and factored markov decision processes, we showed that our agent model
converged upon optimal behaviour not just in theory, but also in practice. Further, the
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experiments justified our intuitions that an agent which conserves information about its
previously learned model upon discovering new unforeseen factors would learn faster
than one which abandoned such information.
This work is takes some of the necessary initial steps in devising an autonomous agent
which can learn in an ever-expanding hypothesis space, and as a result, there are many
fruitful areas in which this work could be extended:
Expanding the Capabilities of the Expert: To restrict the scope of this work, we
placed a number of strong assumptions on the expert and its communication with the
learning agent. However, our ultimate long term goal is to extended such work to have a
human expert assistant. In this case, many of the assumptions that we have made in this
work would have to be lifted. For example, we assume the expert never makes a mistake,
and has full knowledge of the true underlying decision task. Most human experts do
make mistakes, or have only partial knowledge of a problem. Indeed, it is because
humans typically have only partial knowledge, and/or are unable to articulate all their
knowledge precisely and in the absence of sensory prompts, that we modelled our task
as one where the expert offers information ‘piecemeal’, in reaction to the agent’s latest
actions (thereby making the expert’s information relevant, or coherently related, to the
agent’s latest action, whether that action is asking a question, or performing an action in
the domain). But while we support the expert being unable to impart all her knowledge
in advance, we do not yet support that information being fallible. If the expert is fallible,
then our agent would have to weigh the expert’s advice against its own experience, and
possibly revise its beliefs about the expert’s abilities if they are consistently wrong.
There is also room to expand the range of expressibility with which the expert gives
advice. For example, the expert could not only give the advice that one action is better
than another, but also couple this with a partial causal explanation of why one action
is better than another. As discussed throughout previous chapters, this may introduce
further ambiguity due to the relative differences in each speaker’s awareness, as it may
not be clear whether such a causal explanation applies in all cases, or is conditional on
some additional factor that the learning agent is unaware of.
Extending the Complexity of the Tasks: This thesis focussed primarily on discrete,
finite-state decision problems in which variables became fully-observable the moment
the agent became aware of them. However, in many real-world scenarios, a particular
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factor can remain unobservable even after one becomes aware that it is relevant to the
task. Extending such models of unawareness to incorporate the discovery of hidden
variables is a significant challenge.
Another extension would be to consider tasks involving budgeted learning, where
the agent knows it is only able to take a limited number of actions in each task, or
where communication with the expert comes at a cost. Such work would likely involve
evaluated the expected value of information associated with each piece of advice, which
becomes difficult when the agent is potentially unaware of all possible outcomes it
should evaluate over.
Strengthening the Reasoning Abilities of the Learning Agent In our current model,
the agent only asks for advice when there is an explicit conflict between its current
model and the partial descriptions it has gathered from domain and dialogue evidence
so far. However, our agent could potentially be more pro-active, and ask about areas
of the problem where it suspects it is unaware of something. The agent could achieve
this by, for example, looking for structural signatures that indicate the location of a
latent factor (Elidan et al., 2000), or by asking about dependencies for which it has high
uncertainty (Masegosa and Moral, 2013).

Appendix A
The language for partially describing
Decision Networks
The model for learning the true DN (dn+) in Chapter 4 made use of a language L for
partially describing DNs. This language was used in two ways: to represent monotonic
information from evidence, and as a language in which the learner and expert can
communicate about (partial) information about the true DN. Its syntax and semantics
are defined below.
In Chapter 5, we also use a similar language to for partially describing FMDPs. We have
omitted a full specification of this related language to avoid repetition.
A.1 The syntax of the language L
• Terms of the sort: X ,Y . . . are random variable (RV) constants; PaY , X , A , O,
scope(R ), B are Sets of Random Variables (SRV) constants (denoting sets of
random variables in the model). Where Y is an SRV constant, y is a partial-state
assignment (PS) term, denoting a value assignment to each RV constant in Y ;
s is an atomic state (AS) term (denoting a full atomic state in the model). The
language also includes RV variables and AS variables.
• If p is a PS term or an AS term, then it is a well-formed formula (WFF) in L .
• If p is a PS or AS term and X is an SRV constant, then p[X ] is a PS term in L .
105
106 Appendix A. The language for partially describing Decision Networks
• If X is an RV term and Y is an SRV term, then X ∈ Y is a WFF in L .
• If s is an AS term and n is a number, then R (s) = n and R (s)> n are both WFF
in L .
• Where φ,ψ are WFFs, so are ¬φ, φ∧ψ, ∃sφ, ∀sφ (where s is an AS variable), ∃V φ,
∀V φ, and ?λV φ (where V is an RV variable).
Each model dn for interpreting L corresponds to a (unique) complete DN (see Sec-
tion 4.1.1 for definition). Section A.2 then evaluates the formulae of L as partial
descriptions of dn.
A.2 The semantics of L
Let dn = 〈X dn,Adn,Padn,θdn,R dn〉 be a DN and g a variable assignment function.
• For an RV constant X , JXK〈dn,g〉 = X ; similarly for SRV constants.1 This ensures
that JAK〈dn,g〉, JBK〈dn,g〉 and JOK〈dn,g〉 denote sets of variables in the appropriate
position in the probabilistic structure of dn.
• For an AS variable s, JsK〈dn,g〉 = g(s) where g(s) ∈ v(X dn ∪Adn). For an RV
variable V , JV K〈dn,g〉 = g(V ) ∈ X dn∪Adn.
• For an RV term a and an SRV term b, Ja ∈ bK〈dn,g〉 = 1 iff JaK〈dn,g〉 ∈ JbK〈dn,g〉.
• Where p is a PS term, JpK〈dn,g〉 = p.
• For an AS term s and number n, JR (s) = nK〈dn,g〉 = 1 iff Rdn(JsK) = n (with
JR (s)> nK〈dn,g〉 defined analogously).
• where p and q are AS or PS terms, Jp = qK〈dn,g〉 = 1 iff JpK〈dn,g〉 = JqK〈dn,g〉.




(i.e., the projection of the denotation of p onto the set of variables denoted by X ).
• For formulae φ, ψ: Jφ∧ψK〈dn,g〉= 1 iff JφK〈dn,g〉= 1 and JφK〈dn,g〉= 1; J¬φK〈dn,g〉=
1 iff JφK〈dn,g〉 = 0. Where s is an AS, J∃sφK〈dn,g〉 = 1 iff there is a variable assign-
ment function g′ = g[s/p] such that JφK〈dn,g
′〉 = 1.
1If X 6∈ Cdn∪Adn, then JXK〈dn,g〉 is undefined and Definition A.2 ensures that any formula φ featuring
X is such that dn 6|= φ; similarly for propositional terms p featuring a value of a variable that is not a part
of dn.
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• Where V is a RV variable and φ is a formula:
J∃V φK〈dn,g〉 = 1 iff there exists an RV constant X such that Jφ[V/X ]K〈dn,g〉 = 1.
J?λV φK〈dn,g〉 = {φ[V/X ] : X is an RV constant and Jφ[V/X ]K〈dn,g〉 = 1}.
These interpretations yield a satisfaction relation in the usual way: dn |= φ iff there is a
function g such that JφK〈dn,g〉 = 1.

Appendix B
Proof of Update Formulae (3.7)
Note, the derivation below corrects an error from the original Buntine (1991) paper.
The proof that:
BDt(X ,PaX) = BDt−1(X ,PaX)
Nti| j +αi| j−1
Nt.| j +α.| j−1
(3.7)
Follows from the definition of the multivariate-β function in terms of the Γ-function,
and the recursive structure of Γ:






Γ(x) = (x−1)Γ(x−1) (B.2)




β(Nt0| j +α0| j, . . . ,N
t
m| j +αm| j)
β(α0| j, . . . ,αm| j)
(3.2)
Lets assume that dt [X ] = i and dt [PaX ] = j. The only difference between BDt(X ,PaX)
and BDt−1(X ,PaX) is between counts Nti| j and N
t−1
i| j (specifically, that N
t−1
i| j = N
t
i| j−1),
so we can rewrite (3.2) as:
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BDt(X ,PaX) = BDt−1(X ,PaX)
Nti| j +αi| j−1




Task Specifications from Experiments
This chapter gives specifications of DNs used in Chapter 4’s experiments. Tables C.1-C.4
correspond to the barley (18 variable), small (12 variable), medium (24 variable) and
large (36 variable) DNs. Since all variables are binary, numbers the column P(X = 1|Pa)
just give probability that X = 1 for each possible assignment to v(Pa) (Going from
left to right, the first number in each row corresponds to the case where all parents
have assignment 0, and the last number corresponds to the case where all parents have
assignment 1). In addition, the numbers in the R (s) column give the reward received
given the corresponding assignment to the variables in scope(R ).
The DNs were randomly generated by the following process: First, to generate a DN
structure, the structural requirements were posed as a constraint programming problem
(e.g that the variables must form a DAG, action variables cannot have parents, all
variables must be connected to the reward node etc.). Then, using an off-the-shelf
constraint programming library,1 we solved for 100,000 solutions, then chose one
randomly. Each set of parameters θX |PaX was then sampled from a dirichlet distribution
with αi = 1 for all i.
For the sake of space, the specifications for the BNs in Chapter 3 and the FMDPs in
Chapter 5 are not included here. However, full specifications of all BNs used in Chapter
3 can be found at http://www.bnlearn.com/bnrepository/, while full specifica-




112 Appendix C. Task Specifications from Experiments
Table C.1: barley DN (18 variables)
X PaX P(X |PaX )
Soil Type /0 0.50
Temperature /0 0.50
Precipitation /0 0.50
Insect Prevalence /0 0.50
Local Concern /0 0.50
Nitrogen Soil Type, Precipitation, Pesticide, Fertiliser 0.40, 0.60, 0.50, 0.70, 0.30, 0.50, 0.40, 0.60,
0.65, 0.85, 0.75, 0.95, 0.55, 0.75, 0.65, 0.85
Gross Crops Harrow, Nitrogen, Grain 0.50, 0.40, 0.80, 0.70, 0.60, 0.50, 0.90, 0.80
Fungus Temperature, Fungicide, Grain 0.20, 0.50, 0.02, 0.04, 0.30, 0.60, 0.03, 0.06
Weeds Temperature, Harrow, Soil Type 0.20, 0.10, 0.02, 0.01, 0.30, 0.15, 0.03, 0.01
Infestation Insect Prevalence, Pesticide 0.10, 0.50, 0.01, 0.05
Yield Gross Crops, Fungus, Weeds, Infestation 0.20, 0.95, 0.10, 0.50, 0.10, 0.70, 0.05, 0.30,
0.05, 0.65, 0.01, 0.20, 0.01, 0.45, 0.01, 0.10
Protein Nitrogen, Fertiliser, Grain 0.50, 0.90, 0.40, 0.80, 0.40, 0.80, 0.30, 0.70
Bad Press Local Concern, Pesticide 0.00, 0.00, 0.01, 0.50
scope(R ) R (s)
Yield, Protein, Fungus, Bad Press 0.75, 0.88, 0.88, 1.00, 0.50, 0.62, 0.62, 0.75,
0.25, 0.38, 0.38, 0.50, 0.00, 0.12, 0.12, 0.25
Table C.2: small DN: (12 Variables)
X PaX P(X |PaX )
B1 /0 0.50
O1 A4 0.23, 0.18
B2 /0 0.84
B3 /0 0.18
O3 A1, A3, B3 0.31, 0.89, 0.87, 0.15, 0.48, 0.21, 0.90, 0.06
B4 B2 0.45, 0.26
O4 A2, B1 0.78, 0.87, 0.12, 0.07
O2 B2, B4, O1 0.04, 0.75, 0.64, 0.07, 0.36, 0.62, 0.69, 0.17
scope(R ) R (s)
O4, O2, O3 0.98, 0.14, 0.70, 0.35, 0.38, 0.98, 0.11, 0.97
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Table C.3: medium DN (24 variables)









O3 A6, B4, B6 0.66, 0.14, 0.99, 0.83, 0.75, 0.71, 0.30, 0.12
O2 A5, A8, B5 0.26, 0.94, 0.67, 0.18, 0.04, 0.63, 0.87, 0.14
O6 A6, B3 0.87, 0.31, 0.48, 0.13
O4 A1, B8 0.27, 0.51, 0.12, 0.73
O8 A4, B2, O4 0.81, 0.51, 0.44, 0.44, 0.34, 0.82, 0.04, 0.56
O1 A2, A7, O3 0.03, 0.47, 0.74, 0.43, 0.59, 0.08, 0.60, 0.57
O7 B7, O6 0.83, 0.68, 0.27, 0.23
O5 A3, B1, O7 0.75, 0.30, 0.25, 0.35, 0.64, 0.30, 0.31, 0.31
scope(R ) R (s)
O1, O8, O5, O2 0.47, 0.95, 1.00, 0.18, 0.26, 0.75, 0.38, 0.76,
0.60, 0.78, 0.02, 0.75, 0.40, 0.32, 0.30, 0.14
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Table C.4: large DN (36 variables)
X PaX P(X |PaX )
B10 /0 0.43
O9 A12 0.53, 0.82
B11 /0 0.59















O3 B2, B9, O2 0.31, 0.21, 0.71, 0.65, 0.78, 0.17, 0.67, 0.92
O6 A3, B6, B11 0.28, 0.41, 0.55, 0.42, 0.93, 0.58, 0.44, 0.74
O5 A13, B3, B4 0.17, 0.66, 0.93, 0.62, 0.47, 0.08, 0.82, 0.86
O15 A2, A11, O8 0.92, 0.34, 0.25, 0.48, 0.43, 0.25, 0.52, 0.32
O14 A10, B5, B8 0.37, 0.91, 0.75, 0.86, 0.29, 0.33, 0.96, 0.84
O13 A4, A7, B1 0.37, 0.40, 0.74, 0.94, 0.67, 0.70, 0.66, 0.46
O7 B7, B15, O6 0.31, 0.69, 0.17, 0.56, 0.88, 0.40, 0.65, 0.91
O4 A14, O3, O9 0.31, 1.00, 0.59, 0.81, 0.08, 0.20, 0.02, 0.63
O12 B13, B14, O13 0.55, 0.71, 0.61, 0.22, 0.51, 0.90, 0.37, 0.52
O11 A5, B10, O5 0.73, 0.65, 0.42, 0.47, 0.42, 0.34, 0.97, 0.33
O10 A15, B12, O15 0.06, 0.80, 0.42, 0.36, 0.62, 0.97, 0.15, 0.29
O1 A9, O7, O11 0.48, 0.03, 0.14, 0.41, 0.16, 0.64, 0.22, 0.19
scope(R ) R
O1, O4, O14, O10, O12 0.28, 0.19, 0.91, 0.71, 0.68, 0.57, 0.98, 0.86,
0.96, 0.54, 0.19, 0.20, 0.72, 0.61, 0.32, 0.65,
0.64, 0.12, 0.64, 0.67, 0.72, 0.27, 0.05, 0.07,
0.63, 0.09, 0.55, 0.45, 0.19, 0.02, 0.51, 0.13
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